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The Federal Republic of Germany has experienced a fundamental shift in economic 
philosophy from Ordoliberalism to Keynesianism. This paper elucidates the main tenets 
of both schools of thought and their eventual influences on economic policy from 1945 
through the late 1960s. West Germany’s transition to Keynesianism follows a relatively 
cohesive narrative, as the complexities of event history resonate to similar effect in 
academic and political spheres. By the end of this investigation, intellectual quagmires 
surrounding economic successes of the postwar period appear as the logical consequences 
of an academic community that underestimates the importance of normative economic 
philosophy for policy implementation and society writ large. Reconnecting historical 
narrative with economic philosophy thus serves in a dual capacity, clarifying a 
particularly controversial period in economic historiography while also illuminating the 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Few periods in history are as intellectually challenging as mid-twentieth century 
Germany. Powerful associations of world war, totalitarian regime and atrocity resonate 
beyond their immediate temporal circumstance, informing scholarship across the 
disciplines. For German economists, 1945 initially presented a destroyed nation, 
territorially divided, razed of infrastructure, and condemned for heinous crimes. 
Consequently, founders of the new West German state shared a historical imperative, 
each cherishing the opportunity to re-form a stable and just society.   
 
Shared goals, however, did not translate into an operational consensus. Instead, two broad 
academic conceptions formed, which promoted divergent visions of the optimal 
economic order. In previous decades this argument often evolved from the ends of the 
philosophic spectrum, manifested as bitter spats among laissez faire liberals, communist-
leaning socialists and their various partisan offshoots. Post-Hitler, the radical economic 
doctrines of extreme free-marketers or collectivists held little appeal. As the scholar 
Walter Eucken wrote: 
 
The argument today is not at all that between laissez-faire and economic planning. It is not a matter of 
conflict about whether the state should interfere only a little or somewhat more. Actually the defenders of 
laissez-faire have completely disappeared. The conflict is a different one. One side, to which I belong, is of 
the opinion that the state must influence, or even directly establish, the forms and institutional framework 
within which the economy must work. It should, however, avoid the attempt to steer directly the everyday 
business of the economy. Others believe that the state must not just establish the framework, but must 
influence the day-to-day working of the economy on the basis of central planning.
1  
 
The two “moderate” philosophic approaches, known loosely as Ordoliberalism and 
Keynesianism, were distinguished by the extent and manner of government involvement 
in daily economic life. This paper examines these two schools of thought and their 
influences in the first two decades of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). By 
elucidating the philosophic transition of economic policymaking from Ordoliberalism to 
Keynesianism in both academic and policy realms, interested observers are afforded a 
clearer lens through which to interpret postwar German economic history and its 
numerous intellectual quagmires.  
 
2. Intellectual Quagmires 
 
Despite an unenviable starting situation, West Germany’s reconstruction efforts rapidly 
proved to be an unequivocal triumph. As early as the mid 1950s, the German economy 
was a phoenix resurrected.
2 Postwar economic successes, however, remain academically 
problematic. How should one account for West Germany’s swift economic renaissance? 
Are there lessons from that time period for today? Scholars responded to such questions 
with a surfeit of diverse literature. Text, for example, often focused on the influential 
                                                 
1 Eucken, 1950; in Nicholls (1994, pp. 185) 
2 Ludwig Erhard (1958: 232) wrote of the German economy: “The phoenix arises from its ashes.”  
  4 roles of outsiders (viz. the Americans) in the Federal Republic’s economic gestation
3 and, 
similarly, to West German development within the European project.
4 Without 
discounting the importance of exogenous variables during the reconstruction period and 
after, West Germany’s internal economic development occupies perhaps the most 
contentious intellectual battleground.  
 
A primary departure point in postwar German economic historiography concerns authors’ 
treatment of the National Socialist period. Initially, economic rationale followed the 
broader zeitgeist of 1950s and 60s West Germany.
5 For many, the catastrophe of WWII 
and the Nazi period erased previous ideology, government and infrastructure, providing a 
Stunde Null or “Zero Hour” situation in which to completely refashion economic society. 
Ludwig Erhard, the putative “father” of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Social Market 
Economy), frequently contrasted the “old hierarchy” and its material and moral 
deficiencies with his new brand of “prosperity through competition.” (Erhard, 1958: 1) 
The stunning success Erhard attributed to the liberalized market economy presupposed a 
new beginning, overcoming repression with an order that was wholly distinct. As long as 
the economic “Wirtschaftswunder”
6 flourished, so did the Stunde Null historiography.
7
 
In 1955, Henry Wallich published the Mainsprings of the German Revival. Wallich 
attributed the still nascent economic recovery to a mix of international movements (viz. 
East-West geopolitical tensions), remaining postwar factor endowments (such as high 
human capital), and finally, the auspicious economic policies of Allied and German 
authorities. He stressed a fundamentally new order of competition or “free market policy” 
including its positive influences on growth, price stability, employment, and trade 
surpluses. Linkages between periods, whether during Weimar or National Socialist 
regimes, were not significant variables, except as pedagogical reminders of what 
deliberative policy and fortuitous occurrence could overcome. 
 
In the late 1960s and early 70s, “continuity” emerged as a hotly debated theme. In 1967, 
the esteemed volume The German Economy, 1888 to the Present by Gustav Stolper was 
posthumously republished with addendum contributions by Knut Borchardt and Karl 
Häuser. It was an attempt to link, at least chronologically, events on both sides of Hitler’s 
                                                 
3 Prominent examples include Volker Berghahn’s (1986) Americanization of West German Industry, 
Milward’s (1984) investigation of British participation in reconstruction, a superb collection of essays edited 
by Junker (2004) on the United States and Germany from 1945-1990, and extensive clashes over the Marshall 
Plan, perhaps best summarized in an volume edited by Maier and Bischof (1991). For a comprehensive 
investigation of the Western Allied powers’ economic relations with their zones and West Germany’s 
eventual reintegration into the world economy see Buchheim (1990).     
4 See Postan’s (1967) An Economic History of Western Europe; Laqueur’s (1992) Europe in Our Time; and 
the investigation of Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe by Gillingham (1991).    
5 The overall gestalt was to downplay the Nazi period in society and politics. See Frei (2002) for a thorough 
account of the FRG’s attempt to “overcome the past” through a concerted Vergangenheitspolitik.  
6 It should be noted that Erhard did not favor the “miracle economy” interpretation. “What has taken place 
in Germany during the past nine years is anything but a miracle. It is the result of honest efforts of a whole 
people who, in keeping with the principles of liberty, were given the opportunity of using personal initiative 
and human energy.” (1958: 116) 
7 See Arndt (1966) for another “Stunde Null” history written in this period.  
  5rule. In and of itself, this presented a challenge to the Stunde Null, especially as Borchardt 
in particular was a long-time political opponent and intellectual critic of Erhard’s liberal 
economic philosophy.
8 The Stolper tome set a precedent for future continuity narratives, 
foremost of which are Karl Hardach’s (1980) The Political Economy of Germany in the 
20
th Century and Hans-Joachim Braun’s (1990) The German Economy in the Twentieth 
Century. 
 
The Stunde Null came under direct assault in 1975 from Werner Abelshauser’s book 
Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland, 1945-1949. Where previous conceptions discussed a 
unique Wirtschaftswunder, he identified similar economic performance in other European 
nations of the time. He also attributed West Germany’s fantastic growth to pre-1945 
trends. The “economic miracle” was consequently less than miraculous, just a series of 
medium-term business cycles within a longue durée upward trend.
9 Abelshauser also 
argued that National Socialist industrial prowess set the stage for postwar achievements. 
He pointed to figures such as the net industrial production of goods, which at the end of 
1946 was almost twice the value of a decade earlier. (1975: 52) 
 
Substantive questioning of the zero hour thesis and its ensuing economic successes 
followed. If Erhard’s Soziale Marktwirtschaft lacked explanatory creditability given long 
term internal and international trends, then his philosophical policymaking was for 
relative naught. “Continuity” threatened both the economic identity of West Germany 
and the psychological comfort of being wholly different from National Socialist times. 
How was one to account for alleged accomplishments of the Social Market Economy? 
 
The 1970s were a decade of economic stagnation in Germany. As the downturn ended, 
previous standards of growth and employment remained elusive. Scholars wondered why. 
In the absence of definitive evidence that Erhard’s liberalism was directly responsible for 
the Wirtschaftswunder, Abelshauser’s critics attempted to refocus the debate surrounding 
Stunde Null towards a more normative position. Simply stated, when Erhard’s philosophy 
governed, indisputable success followed, whereas post-Erhard events presented a 
decidedly mixed, and from the ‘70s on, stagnant track record. How, such supporters 
asked, did the Social Market Economy transition from market-based success in the 1950s 
and 60s to negative connotations of a bloated “welfare state” in later decades? Continuity 
theory lacked rhetorical persuasiveness when framed by economic performance. 
 
In the 1990s, scholars attempted to resurrect the liberal-defined Social Market Economy. 
While interest in Ordoliberalism and other neoliberal philosophy never completely 
                                                 
8 More polemic histories appeared later, such as Heinz-Dietrich Ortlieb’s (1974) opus which condemned 
“Playboy-Democracy” and liberal “dogma”, asserting instead Free Socialism and a classless society. 
9 Abelshauser recently (2004) affirmed his analysis. Knut Borchardt (1991) also adopted similar reasoning by 
proffering a “secular trend” growth argument in the stead of Wirtschaftswunder. Dietmar Petzina is associated 
with the Abelshauser movement as well, including one co-written (with Abelshauser) volume Deutsche 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte im Industriezeitalter. Konjunktur, Krise, Wachstum (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1990). Other 
relevant Peztina works include Wirtschaftspolitik im britischen Besatzungsgebiet 1945 – 1949 (Duesseldorf: 
Patmos, 1988) and (with R. Ruprecht) Wendepunkt 1945? Kontinuität und Neubeginn in Deutschland und 
Japan nach dem 2. Weltkrieg (Bochum: Universitätsverlag Brockmeyer, 1991). In the Anglophone world, 
Alan Kramer (1991) wrote from the perspective of a “fundamentally healthy” German economy at war’s end. 
  6 waned,
10 circumstances relating to the post-communist transition,
11 German 
Reunification,
12 and unrelenting “Eurosclerosis”
13 spurred renewed curiosity. Two 
transformative works were published during this period. The first was (1992) The Fading 
Miracle, by Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, whose introductory remarks announced 
their philosophical inclinations: “In our view, the main lesson comes down to one 
fundamental proposition: miracles emerge when spontaneity prevails over regulation, and 
they fade when corporatist rigidities impair the flexibility for smooth adjustment.” (pp. 
xi) Supporting text, however, was less advocacy and more chronological blow-by-blow, 
with a stress on impartiality and neutral, often quantitatively-rendered interpretations. In 
stark contrast to the vigorously partisan literature of previous decades, the Fading 
Miracle conveyed the tone and semblance of encyclopedic organization and knowledge.  
 
Anthony J. Nicholls (1994) followed with an unabashed defense of “German 
neoliberalism.” He explored its early philosophical influences and provided biographical 
sketches of various Ordoliberal personalities, constructing a narrative that stressed 
ideologically-motivated policy implementation. Accordingly, Ordoliberalism and its 
associated scholars assumed a central role in postwar economic debates, eventually 
leading to Ludwig Erhard and the Soziale Marktwirtschaft. While Nicholls’ analysis 
derived significant inspiration from its normative focus, it nevertheless established a 
precedent based on extensive archival research and clear, well-reasoned argumentation.
14   
 
Prevailing research allowed neoliberal academics to argue for a variation on the Stunde 
Null, at least insofar as founding philosophy was concerned. Post Abelshauser, the focus 
turned to individual academic contributions – Erhard, Müller-Armack, Eucken etc. – 
emphasizing their determination to achieve an Ordnungspolitik redefinition of German 
economic society. It was relatively persuasive to insinuate a link between the writings of 
particular liberal scholars (which tended to focus on price stability, anti-cartel legislation, 
and limited government intervention) and early institutional developments of the FRG.
15  
 
Most recently, Nützenadel (2005) addressed intellectual elites, as he argued in favor of an 
“expert culture” that framed much of Germany’s postwar history. The leading economic 
personalities of the Federal Republic indeed afforded researchers a luxury often absent in 
other polities: many influential policymakers were in previous incarnation academics and 
thus they left numerous sources articulating their philosophies and viewpoints. 
Nützenadel elucidated the decision-making processes of economic policy by referencing 
                                                 
10 Varying accounts were provided by Blum (1969) Soziale Marktwirtschaft, Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen 
Neoliberalismus und Ordoliberalismus and in articles by Siegfried Karsten (1985) and Konrad Zwieg (1980). 
11 Wolf (1993), for example, used a Wallichian evaluation of the “Lucky Miracle” to rebut the attentions of 
those looking for a ready-made post-communist transition model. 
12 See Smyser (1992) for a traditional Stunde Null history, yet motivated by the “new Stunde Null” in 1989. 
13 A term originally coined by Herbert Giersch in “Eurosclerosis”, Kiel Discussion Paper No. 112, (Institute 
for World Economics, 1985).   
14 Van Hook (2004) also deserves particular mention. His book revisits ground covered by Abelshauser 
(1975), Buchheim (1990), and Kramer (1991), yet manages to contribute fresh material on most fronts (see, 
for example, a superb discussion on the balance of payments and Korean crises in 1952; p. 204-232).  
15 See Riha (1985), Grosskettler (1989) & (1994), Karsten (1992), Reiter & Schmolz (1993), Broyer 
(1996), Witt (2002), Oswalt-Eucken (1994), Vanberg (2004), and Goldschmidt (2004). 
  7the character and ideology of relevant participants, resurrecting a dialogue between the 
policy and academic worlds. This approach provided a remarkably effective analytical 




In sum, academic dissonance over the “facts” created discursive spaces that were claimed 
by ideologically motivated narratives. The literature thus evidences a tendency to 
elucidate its author’s philosophical inclinations rather than what, afforded “original 
position” insight, actually transpired. Postwar German economic history must therefore 
endure twice the scrutiny, from both epistemologically-motivated historians and more 
normative actors seeking justification for current political agenda. 
 
How, then, to answer the fundamental questions surrounding economic historiography of 
the 1950s and 60s?
17 This paper approaches such debates from two positions. First, 
academic movements translated by-and-large into economic policy in the Federal 
Republic. Second, insofar as intellectuals conceived of policy from a historically 
informed position, strict Stunde Null dichotomies cease as relevant descriptive variables. 
In creating a new state, policymakers corrected for historical phenomena through their 
philosophical stances, instilling simultaneously “continuous” and new 
institutions/policies. The methodological premise follows as such: 
 
Individual Politicians  
& Academics 






  Ideological Positions &    






A rigorous history that tracks this process avoids epistemological paralysis, providing an 
operable economic historiography which also informs current circumstance. 
 
This paper asserts that a relatively misunderstood dialogue between academic and 
political spheres underpins German economic history following the Second World War. 
Addressing these historiographical problems first requires a working familiarity with the 
two intellectual movements concerned, Ordoliberalism and Keynesianism. A reader is 
then optimally positioned to re-examine Germany’s economic event history. Having 
traced the origins and development of current trends, underlying difficulties of and 






                                                 
16 Continuity theory did not disappear. Götz Aly (2005), for instance, recently published a controversial 
book which asserted that the “soziale” policies of the SME relied heavily on Nazi innovations. 
17 1) How to account for West Germany’s rapid economic renaissance?  2) Are there lessons for today? 




The word “liberalism” evokes a long lineage of distinguished economic scholars. Adam 
Smith originally revolted against mercantilist conceptions, envisioning in his seminal 
book Wealth of Nations a marketplace where the unfettered efforts of individual actors 
achieved the most efficient and equitable distribution of scarce resources. (Viksnins, 
1997: 30) Smith is regarded as the original apologist for non-interventionist competitive 
society, and even after centuries of modification and redefinition, liberalism continues to 
be envisaged on the basis of individual freedom, market-based competition and the 
absence of government intrusion.   
 
Ordoliberals
18, however, were defined less by their liberal pedigree and more for their 
critique of pure laissez faire persuasions. While Ordoliberalism
19 passionately affirmed 
competitive free markets, it was motivated from the historical observation that 
concentrations of power in both public and private spheres distorted functioning 
exchange economies. Thus, the long-term viability of free markets required a rule-bound 
and limited yet powerful form of government intervention. To quote the prominent liberal 
academic Wilhelm Röpke: 
 
A market economy and our economic program presuppose the following type of state: a state which knows 
exactly where to draw the line between what does and what does not concern it, which prevails in the 
sphere assigned to it with the whole force of its authority, but refrains from all interference outside its 
sphere – an energetic umpire whose task it is neither to take part in the game nor to prescribe their 
movements to players, who is rather, completely impartial and incorruptible and sees to it that the rules of 
the game and of sportsmanship are strictly enforced. That is the state without which a genuine and real 
market economy cannot exist. (Röpke, 1950: 192) 
 
Defining the “rules of the game” of a competitive market society was an Ordoliberal 
scholar’s underlying mission. The following section will outline the basic tenets of 
Ordoliberalism as they relate to German economic policy in the postwar era. 
 
3.1.1 Competitive Markets and Monopoly Power – The temporal location of 1930s 
Freiburg im Breisgau, a university city in provincial Baden under an increasingly 
despotic Nazi regime, provided the setting for much of the intellectual activity now 
associated with Ordoliberalism. By chance, economist Walter Eucken (1891-1950), 
jurists Franz Böhm (1895-1977) and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, (1894-1944) and others 
found themselves independently researching from various standpoints the same issue: 
                                                 
18 Scholars Walter Eucken, Hans Grossmann-Doerth and Franz Böhm are thought of as the core Ordoliberal 
establishment. However, the German neo-liberal tradition encompasses a much larger informal 
membership, many of whom espoused similar ideals. Sympathetic academicians prominently included 
Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow, Constantine von Dietze and Leonhard Miksch, notwithstanding more 
politically notable personalities such as Alfred Müller-Armack and Ludwig Erhard.  
19 “Ordoliberalism” stems from the Latin ordo, which means inner order, in contrast to ordinato, or one 
externally imposed. (Grosskettler, 1989: 43) 
  9private power in a free society.
20 (Rieter & Schmolz, 1993: 96) The result of these 
investigations was a blending of the fields of law and political economy.
21  
 
Freiburg academics believed that combating harmful concentrations of power 
necessitated both disciplines. An otherwise competitive marketplace often failed from lax 
legal structures. Examples included: a) the sub-optimal allocation of resources based on 
monopoly-skewed pricing, b) the de facto closing of previously accessible markets to 
other producers, c) overly-generous patent protections, d) limited liability law, and e) the 
arbitrary application of liability law. (Eucken, 1952: 178) These creeping restrictions 
threatened the efficiency and equity of unencumbered market distribution. Thus, anti-
monopoly policy in particular was to be embedded into a state’s legal system, along with 
safeguards against labor monopsony, such that discretionary imperatives of policymakers 
were limited to the maintenance of competitive markets. (Möschel, 1989: 142) Eucken 
suggested that the aim of anti-cartel legislation was to induce the bearers of economic 
power to behave as if they operated in a regime of perfect competition. (Zweig, 1980: 25)  
 
Perfect competition remained more of an ideal than a pragmatic model. Franz Böhm 
admitted: “Practical policies to establish competition and to check anti-market 
power…[cannot] mold reality into the image of the theoretical model of perfect 
competition. Suffice it to create as much competition or rivalry as is practical under given 
circumstances.” (in Zweig, 1980: 26) Anti-cartel legislation, however, provoked sanguine 
suggestions. Eucken recommended that a politically neutral Monopolamt (Cartel Office) 
be responsible for regulating issues relating to market power. (Eucken, 1952: 294) As 
Friedrich A. Lutz, one of Eucken’s first students aptly summarized: “It seems to me that 
no situation is less desirable than one in which determination of the share of the national 
product is left to economic and political power struggles.” (Lutz, 1956: 152)    
 
The more politically involved Ordoliberal cadre, particularly Alfred Müller-Armack and 
Ludwig Erhard, were similarly opposed to monopoly power. They considered the protection 
of free competition to be the most important “social” principle of their Social Market 
Economy. (Müller-Armack, 1956: 84) Erhard betrayed the extent of his monopoly power 
worries in a letter to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1949: “Such important problems as 
decartelization and liberalization…[are] problems which must be properly solved if our 
social market economy is not to become a farce.” (in Nicholls, 1994: 271) 
 
Erhard anticipated attempts to limit competition, as well as the reflexive policy influences 
of strong concentrations of private power in the public sphere. Special interests, while 
inevitable in the context of a free society, were to be de-fanged within the state’s bounded 
regulation of the economic process. “Government also is constantly faced with a 
considerable temptation to meet the contradictory demands of many pressure 
groups…Thus it is not only the pressure groups that scratch each other’s backs but also 
the pressure groups in association with the government. It is certainly no exaggeration to 
describe these directly opposite events…as a danger to the social system.” (Böhm, 1996: 
                                                 
20 For more on the history of the Freiburg School, its membership and resistance to Nazism see Grosskettler 
(1989), Rieter and Schmolz (1993), Goldschmidt (1997) and Vanberg (2004). 
21 Böhm, Eucken & Grossman-Doerth’s “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936” explains the law/economics dynamic. 
  10 66) Hence, Eucken and other Freiburg Ordoliberals conceived of a Wirtschaftsverfassung 
(economic constitution) to exactly define the role of government in the economy, such 
that the crucial underpinnings of economic policy remained absent from the realm of 
discretionary politicking or the sway of possible anti-competitive interests. (Vanberg, 
2004: 10-11) Improper lobbying in the public sphere and monopolistic arrangements of 
private power were seen as one in the same, both attempts to suspend competition and the 
numerous societal welfare benefits therein entailed. 
 
3.1.2. Stable, Functioning Prices – For Ordoliberals, free and open markets were 
inextricably intertwined with a stable, functioning system of reflective prices. Twentieth 
Century German history provided considerable evidence for the destabilization of society 
due to catastrophic price volatility. During the post World War I hyperinflation – where 
in 1919 one U.S. dollar was worth 8.4 Reichmarks and by late 1923 that same dollar 
bought 4.2 trillion RM – economic and civil society all but collapsed. (Campbell, Holt, 
Walker 1996, pp. 163) Rampant inflation, however, was not the only monetary difficulty. 
Government intervention either in fixing or artificially valuing prices also curried ill 
effects. With a corrupted price mechanism, it was impossible to value and thus maintain 
efficient, competitive economic activity. As Eucken pointed out, when the Nazi regime 
froze prices and wages in 1936, they “no longer expressed the relationship between needs 
and supplies…calculations based on these prices for products and for the means of 
production could not command the factors of production to meet the needs of the plan; 
profit and loss calculations and budgets gave no information as to whether the factors of 
production were being combined optimally for the production of goods as planned by the 
central authorities.” (Eucken, 1948a: 91) Without an accurate gauge of costs and benefits, 
production and consumption became arbitrary, at least from the standpoint of markets, 
while every ‘uninformed’ decision by households and firms multiplied the capricious 
distribution of scarce resources. (Eucken, 1948: 28) Eucken concluded that Hitler’s 
regime extended control over the exchange economy simply by freezing prices, which 
made the entire market edifice dependent on governmental allocation and direction. 
 
Wilhelm Röpke coined the term “repressed inflation” to describe a situation in which 
prices should rise, but the state prevents monetary devaluation. “Open inflation is bad 
enough because it is the cause of crying injustices and because it leads to unbalanced 
production. Repressed inflation is, if anything, somewhat worse because it adds 
stagnation to unbalanced production and unjust distribution.”
22 (Röpke, 1947: 247) He 
was referring in particular to the postwar monetary reality of occupied Germany. 
Heinrich Rittershausen, a specialist in monetary theory, described the situation in early 
1948: “The pricing system we have has come down to us from 1936. Until 1945 it was 
adjusted [upwards] by about 40 or 50 per cent. Since 1945 it has been further adjusted by 
an amount which on average has been 20 per cent of the original price level.” (in 
Nicholls, 1994: 188) This arbitrary system of valuation bore little relation to scarcity 
conditions. A vicious cycle was established as compulsory valuations became ever more 
fictitious, forcing the government to redouble controls in order to maintain its policy, and 
so on. (Röpke, 1947: 247) The result for the everyday worker was a return to primitive 
                                                 
22 See Against the Tide (Röpke, 1969) chapter 6 for further clarification of ‘Repressed Inflation.’  
  11barter exchange, or the use of “cigarette currency”
23, complemented by subsistence 
farming and production, all under the auspices of an authoritarian government. Eucken 
colorfully borrowed Lenin’s expertise: “To destroy civil society, one must debauch its 
monetary system.”
24 (Eucken, 1952: 255) For Ordoliberals, flawed pricing directly 
caused economic disaster and political totalitarianism.  
 
3.1.3. Social Policy and Government Intervention – The divergence of Ordoliberal 
thought from traditional neo-liberal musings, as espoused by “hands-off” Manchester 
School or Austrian thinkers, came in its assertion of obligations beyond bounded 
protections of competitive markets. Traditional neo-liberals, like Friedrich von Hayek, 
distrusted Ordoliberalism’s interest in social justice and equitable distributions of 
wealth.
25 Hayek was not fond of the so-called “social intervention.” He found in the word 
‘social’ itself an excuse to disguise a collectivist, and hence anti-social, agenda.
i Yet 
Ordoliberal conceptions of market intervention derived from witnessing the numerous 
horrific turns of 20
th Century German history. Scholars viscerally understood that a large 
majority of citizens must share in the prosperity of the free market system for it to enjoy 
long-term stability. However, Ordoliberal conceptions varied widely as to what a proper 
social intervention entailed. Seen in retrospect, this academic dissonance became vital to 
the economic policy implementation process of the FRG. 
 
Ordoliberals believed that the true social benefits of their system derived inherently from 
the long-term stability of competitive markets. The social dogma of Ludwig Erhard can 
be summarized in three basic tenets: a) the suppression of arbitrary and disorderly 
political and economic power, b) the elimination of monopolistic structures and c) the 
ceaseless functioning of individual freedom and competition. (Goldschmidt, 2004: 12) 
Little else was required to ensure the enduring welfare of most citizens.  
 
Eucken, however, presented a more complex theoretical picture. The “constituting” 
fundamentals of his competitive order were complemented by “regulating” principles. 
Other than the strict control of monopoly power, these included the public regulation of 
severe supply side anomalies such as drastic unemployment, the redistribution of income 
through progressive taxes, and the correction of societal externalities due to large 
discrepancies between short-term profits and the long-term collective interest. (Eucken, 
1952: Ch. XVI) This vague language sanctioned a broad swath of possible policies. 
Eucken distinguished, in particular, public health initiatives (Grosskettler, 1989: 50) and 
the need for environmental regulation.
ii Presumably, basic unemployment insurance, 
disability coverage and state-funded education also met the re-distributive mandate. 
Unfortunately, particulars of Eucken’s regulating principles were not as well defined as 
                                                 
23 Werner Plumpe (2004: 295) reported that in 1946, “one cigarette could fetch more than could be earned 
by a full day’s work.”  
24 “Um die bürgerliche Gesellschaft zu zerstören, muss man ihr Geldwesen verwüsten.” As an interesting 
aside, Lenin’s famous quote actually emanated from the pen of John Maynard Keynes, and despite many 
attempts to authenticate his sourcing, Keynes’ Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920: 235) remains 
its first accredited reference.   
25 For various writings on the relationship between Hayek, Austrian thought and Ordoliberalism see 
Oswalt-Eucken (1994: 7), Streit & Wohlgemuth (1997) and Vanberg (2002).  
  12 they might have been, owing to his early death in 1950. It is, however, safe to assume that 
for Eucken, social policies were only acceptable insofar as they did not infringe upon the 
primacy of stable, reflective prices in a fully competitive marketplace.  
Müller-Armack more aggressively asserted a social function for the state. Motivated in 
part by a strong Catholic faith
26, he wrote extensively on social mandates, especially 
concerning income equality. “Income redistribution is brought about through welfare 
benefits, equalization of pensions and compensation payments, housing grants, subsidies 
et cetera.” (Müller-Armack, 1956: 84) Fundamental differences with other Ordoliberals 
arose from such opinions, which encouraged government subsidization of housing, food 
and so on. More rigorous Freiburg types worried that such steps constituted an 
unacceptable tampering with prices.  
 
Alexander Rüstow also advanced a bold imperative for government intervention:  
 
If we were agreed that every new condition of equilibrium which arose in the normal way was the most 
appropriate solution even though many frictional losses and disagreeable phases had to be overcome en 
route, it would seem highly advisable to try to achieve this condition withouth (sic) delay…That would be 
interference in precisely the opposite direction to that in which we have hitherto proceeded, i.e. not contrary 
to the laws of the market but in conformity with them: not to maintain the old situation but to bring about a 
new one, not to delay the natural course of events but to accelerate it. (Rüstow, 1932: 184-85) 
 
He offered the example of an agricultural sector threatened by structural change resulting 
in a lack of competitiveness. In this instance, the role of the government would not be to 
protect the failing sector, but rather to encourage a rapid transition to a new equilibrium.   
 
If we then decided to emulate the Manchester school and simply let things take their course, the following 
condition would supervene only after decades of distress…Those capable of adjustments would have 
carried them out accordingly: those not in a position to do so would have been forced to quit their plot of 
land and try elsewhere to find somewhere of permanence. My proposal is that this final situation should be 
immediately established by accelerating and facilitating the potential adjustments by educational and 
financial aid. (Rüstow, 1932: 185) 
 
Rüstow thus presented a new social logic for structural unemployment insurance and 
educational assistance: government interference to hasten a ‘new equilibrium’ by helping 
the transitionally displaced. 
 
While examples of governmental interaction with economic society often displayed a 
marked social mentality, Ordoliberals insisted that such measures 1) were limited in 
scope to the truly social-fabric-ripping vagaries, 2) would not disrupt the primacy of 
prices and anti-monopoly controls and 3) were not influenced by biased interest groups.  
 
There was, however, a second type of state intervention, which dealt primarily with 
business cycles, or the fluctuations of employment, investment, consumption and income 
growth through periods of boom and bust. Most Ordoliberals declared active attempts to 
‘smooth’ or manage such cycles as dangerously close to centralized planning, which they 
dreaded. Hans Willgerodt summarized the liberal critique of anti-cyclical policy: “A 
continuous series of counter-measures by the Government to reverse economic trends 
                                                 
26 See Müller-Armack (1955) “Wirtschaftspolitik in der sozialen Marktwirtschaft” for more on his Catholic sway. 
  13puts the public…in a mood of continuous expectation of change. As a result, the range of 
complementary governmental services begins to fluctuate – particularly in respect of state 
investment. In conjunction with an official policy of structural distortion, this state 
action…tends to exercise a destabilizing impact on the economy and on [individual] 
planning.” (Willgerodt, 1979: 164) In the end, measures meant to manage business cycles 
actually exacerbated investor uncertainty, causing the very swings in growth and 
unemployment they were meant to solve.  
 
Other Ordoliberals, such as Müller-Armack, Eucken and Röpke, entertained more 
nuanced opinions on business cycle management. Müller-Armack thought the state 
should engage in limited (and vaguely defined) business cycle management: “Within the 
framework of budget stability and a sound monetary constitution, however, politico-
economic dynamism can certainly be maintained and, if necessary, fortified by contra-
cyclical measures.” (Müller-Armack, 1956: 85) In fact, early writings of Müller-Armack 
displayed enthusiastic support for active monetary business cycle policy, especially to 
cool off a credit boom. (Müller-Armack, 1929: 665) 
 
Eucken also endorsed “supply anomaly” intervention. He believed a government must 
actively engage in labor markets during situations of drastic structural unemployment, for 
example by subsidizing minimum wages, such that lower labor costs encouraged 
additional hiring (Eucken, 1952: 304). Röpke told a more monetary story, suggesting that 
depressions stemmed in the first instance from dire capital market conditions:  
 
If in such a situation the elasticity of demand for credit becomes almost absolutely rigid, attempts at credit 
expansion will not lead to the desired expansion of total demand for commodities, but merely to an increase 
of general liquidity. Now the reluctance of entrepreneurs to enter upon new investment is due not only to 
the confidence crisis, to the recession of prices, and to the over-investment of the previous boom, but also 
to the fact that entrepreneurs will not dare, for the purpose of long-term investment, to have recourse to 
short-term credits…unless a marked recovery of the stock exchange points to the possibility of an early 
consolidation…The same line of reason suggests that it is well-conceived policy…for central banks or 
similar authorities to take the initiative by means of heavy buying, in preventing a total collapse of security 
markets. (Röpke, 1933: 436-37) 
 
Röpke believed that normalcy in labor markets would be restored by extending long-term 
credit at reasonable rates, a task only a government body could reasonably undertake.
27
 
While various authors endorsed wide-ranging intervention methods, sparse application 
was the uniting aspect of all Ordoliberal “counter-cyclical” measures. Such policies were 
intellectually derived from the experience of the Great Depression – during which 
anywhere from 28-32 percent of German workers applied for unemployment insurance – 
and it was to a similarly disastrous situation that Ordoliberals addressed their 
interventionist oeuvre. (Voth, 1995: 802-3)
28 As Röpke wrote, “We have to distinguish 
                                                 
27 While business cycle theory is now mostly associated with Keynes, a simultaneous (and autonomously 
anticipatory) movement also occurred in Germany involving such academics as N. Neisser, W. Lautenbach, 
G. Haberler and of course Röpke. For a closer look at such “proto-Keynesian” ideas see Klausinger (1999). 
28 Interestingly enough, Voth (1995) argues that even the Great Depression in Germany cannot be considered a 
literal failure of strict classical principles (downward pressure on wages until the labor market clears.) In fact, real 
wages remained relatively high – an indexed 118 in 1929 vs. 100 in 1913 – as lowering them was not a politically 
  14 between a primary and a secondary phase of the crisis. The latter is characterized by a 
circulus vitiosus which constantly interferes with the attainment of a new equilibrium.” 
(Röpke, 1933: 434) Only in the instance of a “vicious cycle” morass was public 
intervention sanctioned. If the choice was to err on the side of too little or too much 
government involvement, Ordoliberals favored the former. 
 
3.1.4. Conclusions - In Ordoliberalism one finds both idealistic and pragmatic visions of 
the optimal economic order. While often profoundly utopian in their thinking – viz. the 
functioning of democratic government without special interest involvement – scholars 
like Eucken, Böhm, Röpke, Erhard and Müller-Armack were ultimately concerned that 
their ideas be implemented in reality. For that generation of Germans, drawing a sharp 
distinction between the academic and real worlds seemed naïve and foolish given two 
World Wars and Weimar’s numerous economic catastrophes. 
 
When Ordoliberalism did influence policy in the new FRG, its strengths and weaknesses 
shined through. On the basic principles and structure of society – or the free market 
allocation of scarce resources, uninhibited competition and stable reflective prices – there 
was little disagreement or hesitation. However, when deliberating on government 
intervention for social purposes, Ordoliberals were conflicted about necessary or tolerable 
policy. It was obvious from ever-present problems of collective action and the global 
Great Depression crisis that some sort of society-level externality and business cycle 
management was required, but to allow for a discretionary mandate in those areas also 
opened the Pandora’s Box of centralized planning. The closest Freiburg thinkers came to 
a “practicable” implementation strategy was the Wirtschaftsverfassung, or a definition of 
fiscal and monetary parameters which “caged the beast” of government intervention. 
Such genres of constitutional thought spawned quite a bit of fervor across the Atlantic in 
later decades;
29 however, in the German postwar institutional context the concept 
received scant attention at best. In as much, accounting for the “social” motivations of the 
Soziale Marktwirtschaft requires additional investigations. Ordoliberalism was not the 




Returning to hardships in the Great Depression and the various nefarious experiences of 
the interwar period, it is hardly surprising that a new brand of economic theory would 
emerge to challenge the obviously lacking status quo. While neoliberalism proper 
trumpeted a return to free markets, John Maynard Keynes saw events in a different light. 
For him, ultimate failings were intrinsic to the basic assumptions of classical economic 
theory, which supported liberal ideals on free market allocation. Recourse for these errors 
was found in active and informed governmental management of macroeconomic trends. 
                                                                                                                                                   
feasible solution given the threat of social instability. (Voth, 1995: 803) Amid this wage-inflexibility morass, 
classical economic convention even suggested raising wages to spur a “substitution effect”, encouraging labor-
replacing capital formation despite 30% unemployment. (ibid: 817-818) It was exactly this classical explanation of 
“wage stickiness” that Keynes addressed.  
29 For more on the linkages between the Constitutional Economics qua James Buchanan and Freiburg 
Ordoliberalism, see Liepold (1990) and Vanberg (1998)  
  153.2.1. Employment Theory and Business Cycles – Classical interpretations of 
employment rely on the unfettered equilibrium of supply and demand in labor markets. In 
a situation of ‘disequilibrium,’
30 for example an influx of new labor into the workforce or 
an exogenous change in the demand for labor, – caused by new technology, a decrease in 
the demand for products, etc. – wages adjust accordingly and markets clear. Employment 
is thus a neutral factor, as equilibrium maintains itself through the fluctuation of wages. 
‘Involuntary’ structural employment should not exist in a hypothetical world. 
 
During the economic crises of the interwar period, classical theory suggested that wages 
should decrease until all jobless-but-willing workers were accommodated. The massive 
involuntary unemployment of the 1930s represented in graphic detail, however, the 
drastic flaws with such suppositions. Keynes
31 wrote:   
 
The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidian world who, discovering that in 
experience straight lines apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping straight – as the only 
remedy for the unfortunate collisions which are occurring. Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw 
over the axiom of parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar is required today in 
economics. We need to throw over the second postulate of the classical doctrine and to work out the behavior 
of a system in which involuntary unemployment in the strict sense is possible. (Keynes, 1936; 1949: 16-7) 
 
The error resulted from classical theory’s failure to account for the “stickiness” of wage 
adjustments. (Gottschalk, 2002: 7) For Keynes, the relationship between wages and 
employment also reflected a given public’s propensity to consume, the marginal 
efficiency of the capital schedule, and the real interest rate. He asserted “if, without any 
change in these factors, entrepreneurs were to increase employment as a whole, their 
proceeds will necessarily fall short of their supply-price.” (Keynes, 1936; 1949: 261) 
Thus, increasing employment by lowering wages required the redefinition (in terms of a 
firm’s marginal cost and revenue calculations) of other variables, including consumption 
patterns, the efficiency of capital (given more labor inputs) and interest rates. Labor 
markets simply did not clear to equilibrium in a short period of time, if at all.   
 
Keynes also focused his critique on the problem of ‘aggregate demand,’ especially during 
downswings in the business cycle. (Keynes, 1936; 1949: 258) He attempted to show that a 
drop in aggregate demand necessarily followed from declines in employment, as opposed to 
the classical assumption that firm investment increased as consumption declined, balancing 
total demand. For Keynes, prices fell with wages, but because wages were “sticky,” there 
was a real income distribution away from capital owners. Thus, savings were not converted 
into investment as firms had a disincentive to invest based on their relatively high real costs 
of labor, not to mention the original fall in consumption. Falling wages and prices at home 
also eroded trade balance purchasing power, further reducing real incomes and decreasing 
the marginal propensity to consume. (ibid: 263) Finally, expectations often manifested in 
reality, so “a vicious cycle of unduly pessimistic estimates” weighs upon perceptions; 
investment and consumption fall as a consequence. (ibid; 1949: 264) 
                                                 
30 This is a tricky term, because theoretically-speaking, disequilibria of this sort should not exist. 
31 Among other famous (and frequently misquoted as he was referring specifically to monetary crises and 
not employment or business cycle policy per se) Keynes-isms was the observation that, “in the long run, we 
are all dead.” (Keynes, 1923: Vol. 4, Chp. 3, pp. 65) 
  16 Economic recession is therefore caused by deficient demand for both labor and goods, 
which continue to reinforce one another. Unemployed workers result from firms not 
selling enough goods and services, while firms resist increasing production because of 
insufficient aggregate demand, which remains deficient because people are unemployed! 
(Gottschalk, 2002: 8) In sum, the negative effects of relatively minor and routine business 
cycle fluctuations can snowball into larger economic problems because of self-
perpetuating aggregate demand losses. 
 
Keynes’ General Theory redefined the dependent variables of economics, focusing 
attention on levels of employment and per capita calculations of national income vis-à-vis 
wages. (Keynes, 1936; 1949: 254) Vicious cycles of aggregate demand loss and sticky 
wage adjustment led to a logical normative position concerning the role of government in 
economic society. Keynesianism unequivocally called for the maximization of 
employment through the macro-level demand management of business cycles.   
 
3.2.2. Fiscal Demand Management – Keynes concluded that the state must guide 
fluctuations of aggregate demand, if possible without centralizing economic life: 
 
I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment will prove the only means 
of securing an approximation to full employment; though this need not exclude all manner of compromises 
and of devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative. But beyond this no obvious 
case is made out for a system of State Socialism which would embrace most of the economic life of the 
community. It is not the ownership of the instruments of production which it is important for the State to 
assume. If the State is able to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted to augmenting the 
instruments and basic rate of reward to those who own them, it will have accomplished all that is necessary. 
(Keynes, 1936; 1949: 378)  
 
Keynesian demand management differed from other forms of statism in the ownership of 
the means of production. Keynes affirmed the market allocation principles celebrated by 
classical economists in spheres of micro activity, amending only their macro economic 
aggregates. He wrote, “apart from the necessity of central controls to bring about an 
adjustment between the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest, there is no 
more reason to socialize economic life than there was before.” (Keynes, 1936; 1949: 379) 
The state therefore requires only the tools necessary to achieve full employment over 
both the short and long term. This position, however, does not preclude state ownership 
should it be deemed necessary.   
 
Keynes was less precise on the actual functioning of the fiscal prerogative. “All sorts of 
policies for increasing the propensity to consume” complemented a “socially controlled 
rate of investment” through business cycles. (Keynes, 1936; 1949: 325) Further 
scholarship articulated such policies in more detail.
32 Indeed, modern fiscal 
macroeconomics emerged from the intellectual tradition established by Keynes’ demand 
management. The idea that one can mimic reality with a model, not just as an 
illuminating epistemological endeavor, but to pinpoint suboptimal economic behavior 
and craft targeted macro-level interventions, is, philosophically-speaking, Keynesian.  
 
                                                 
32 See Gordon (1990), Mankiw (1990) and Samuelson (1939).  
  173.2.3. Prices, Wages and Money – Traditional understandings of unemployment were 
not the only casualties of Keynes’ probing mind. He also targeted the underlying 
assumptions of classical monetary theory: 
 
In equilibrium – i.e. when the factors of production are fully employed, when the public is neither bullish of 
securities…and when the volume of saving is equal both to cost and to the value of new investments – there 
is a unique relationship between the quantity of money and the price level of consumption-goods and of 
output as a whole, of such a character that if the quantity of money were double the price-levels would be 
double also. Such an exact balance is, of course, only a theoretical possibility. In the actual world a change 
in anything is likely to be accompanied by some change in everything else. (Keynes, 1930; 1958: 146-7)     
 
The implications of this “sticky” real price adjustment de-linked the exact relationship of 
money supply and inflation. Ergo, nominal fluctuations in money supply partly 
transferred to other “real” variables, such as output, consumption and employment.
33 As 
to the policy implications of this monetary dynamic, Keynes was less explicit, focusing 
more of his attention on investment and consumption facets of demand management.
34  
 
Some decades later, in 1958, A.W. Phillips articulated the relationship between nominal 
changes in wages (and consequently overall nominal prices) and unemployment figures. 
Drawing on historical data in Britain from 1861-1957, Phillips found that unemployment 
and nominal wage growth rates were negatively correlated and, importantly, non-linear. 
(Phillips, 1958: 285) The logarithmic shape of Phillips’ curve seemed to confirm his 
hypothesis that tight labor markets during business cycle booms caused employers to bid 
wages rapidly up, whereas loose labor markets with high rates of unemployment 
witnessed a relatively slow downward wage revision. (ibid: 283) Statistical evidence 
supported the conclusion that both marginal and absolute rates of unemployment were 
correlated with nominal wage levels: 
 
It seems from the relation fitted to the data that if aggregate demand were kept at a value which would 
maintain a stable level of product prices the associated level of unemployment would be a little under 2.5 
percent. If, as is sometimes recommended, demand were kept at a value that would maintain stable wage 
rates the associated level of unemployment would be about 5.5 percent. (Phillips, 1958: 299) 
 
Thus, increasing nominal wages inversely affected unemployment, advancing the 
hypothesis that price changes could be used to manage overall macro employment levels 
and thus national and per capita income. The Phillips Curve’s non-linear shape indicated 
that nominal changes were most potent during the peaks and troughs of the business 
cycle, firmly placing monetary policy in the pantheon of powerful demand management 
tools. Plus, exact targeting of the substitution quotient between inflation and employment 
was not technically necessarily, as planners were assured that increasing nominal prices 
would decrease unemployment in any case.
35  
 
                                                 
33 For example, increasing money supplies spurs a change in the velocity of money, as the general populace 
is less likely to hold on to an inflating currency. Thus, the marginal propensity to consume rises. People 
buy more stuff. Businesses produce more. Output rises. Businesses hire. 
34 Keynes, however, endorsed discretionary monetary policy to influence output and steady investment 
through business cycle fluctuation. See Book VII, A Treatise of Money (1930a; 1958a) for more in this vein.  
35 Incidentally, such trust proved premature, as was viscerally demonstrated during the 1970’s “Stagflation.” 
  18 3.2.4. Conclusions - Keynesian policymakers are aided by two major policy instruments 
in their mandate to combat unemployment and stabilize the inevitable business cycle 
booms and busts: fiscal demand management (of both consumption and investment) 
through taxation and government spending, and the targeting of nominal wage rates using 
the overall money supply and, accordingly, price changes. Keynesians continue to define 
the interaction of the two policy strategies to this day. (Vines and others, 1983: 13)   
 
Normative Keynesian literature envisions state intervention as the primary fix for 
aggregate demand problems. The academic and practical debate therefore revolves 
around the most appropriate means to measure and redress market deficiencies. 
Keynesianism posited proactive and pragmatic economic science, seeking, as Joseph 
Schumpeter aptly wrote: “to make that vision of our age analytically operative.” 
(Schumpeter, 1949: 80) Once fully articulated, it was indeed a vision that would motivate 
policymakers all over the world, including those in Germany. 
 
3.3. Ordoliberalism and Keynesianism 
 
Before advancing to the historical analysis, it is informative to first reflect on the two 
major philosophical underpinnings of German economic policy. In many senses, 
Ordoliberals and Keynesians shared the same basic principles: a belief in the underlying 
efficiency and equity of free market allocation and the necessity of state intervention to 
protect economic society from phenomena outside the agency of individual actors. They 
also agreed as to the power of nominal price changes, except Ordoliberals feared possible 
inflationary and deflationary consequences while Keynesians embraced the discretionary 
monetary imperative as a valuable tool.   
 
Reasons for and methods of government involvement in economic life differed 
completely. Private power concentration was a non-issue for Keynes, presumably 
because adverse effects on employment or overall output would be set straight by the 
state. In fact, having fewer but larger enterprises made macro stewardship of the economy 
easier. On the other hand, Ordoliberals were appalled at the type of state dirigisme 
Keynes supported,
36 seeing it as an unacceptable subordination of freedom in micro 
affairs to the macro prerogatives of central planners. Here, indeed, was a major 
distinguishing theme: Ordoliberals by-and-large thought in terms of micro behavior – 
shaping the parameters and rules of individual initiative – whereas Keynesians embraced 
macro management – dictating the ebb and flow of aggregate demand. In addition, 
“fixed” versus “discretionary” government prerogatives effectively summarized the 
interventionist methodology of Ordoliberalism and Keynesianism, respectively. 
 
                                                 
36 Röpke wrote: “After the world has for many years – and indeed far too inactively – put up with a 
devastating depression, people will only be too eager to make every and any sacrifice in order to forestall 
the repetition of such a tragedy even on a small scale…To make matters worse, even leading economists 
(particularly the late J.M. Keynes) come and tell us in rather incomprehensible books that what we have to 
sacrifice for the sake of economic stabilization is…a mere problem of continuously prolonging the boom 
by means of the business cycle mechanism and thus, in an exceedingly dangerous manner, attention is 
diverted from the deeper causes upsetting the equilibrium.” (Röpke, 1950: 171-2) 
  19The ontological difficulties of comparing Ordoliberalism and Keynesianism also merit a 
brief disclaimer. Ordoliberalism is a historical understanding,
37 a philosophical 
assessment of the optimal economic and legal order. Keynesianism, on the other hand, is 
a model in the most rigorous way, with assumptions, formulae, quantitative methodology, 
and an internally coherent mathematics. Any attempt at a comparative analysis, therefore, 
runs the risk of relating “apples to oranges,” philosophy to econometrics.
38  
 
In the subsequent historical analysis, it is imperative to keep the two genres of economic 
thought in mind. A narrative unfolds around the gradual shift, in both academia and 
policy, from an Ordoliberal consensus in the late 1940s and early 50s to an eventual 
Keynesian coup. By the end of the 1960s, Keynesianism was the operative blueprint for 
the economic dealings of the FRG. This dynamic, in turn, provides an instructive 
framework for approaching broader questions of policy and theory. 
 
4. The Economic Historical Record 
 
4.1. Time Period 1: (l945-1948) “Original Debate” 
 
4.1.1. Historical Situation: Post World War II German policymakers faced an 
unenviable economic situation: ten million people dead, 81 percent of urban housing 
destroyed, 740 of 958 important bridges bombed and industry all but halted. (Laqueur, 
1993: 6-7) In 1945, industrial production achieved only 10 to 15 percent of pre-war 
capacity.
39 Agricultural yields fell, such that the average daily caloric consumption per 
person decreased from the rationed 2000 in 1943 to virtual starvation levels of 700-800 in 
1947. (Tuchtfeldt, 1955: 60) Feeding the populace was complicated by a massive 
immigration of German minorities from Soviet controlled regions, about 10 million by 
1950.
40 The Nazi Zwangswirtschaft (coercion economy) also remained mostly in place, 
which continued centralized decision-making over prices, production prerogatives and 
infrastructure (re)construction. Given a collapse of the monetary system, hording was 
common, as was a proliferation of black market activities. Finally, the former Reich 
depended on the charity of its victors, who separated it into four administrative zones and 
imposed often divergent policy agendas.
41
 
4.1.2. Academia: With this bleak economic picture as a backdrop, German academics in 
the British and American Zones began to discuss reform. It was obvious to all involved 
                                                 
37 This should not be methodologically confused with Historicism (a la Gustav von Schmoller), to which 
Eucken especially was vehemently opposed. 
38 Nevertheless, Ordoliberalism and Keynesianism remain economic “fruit.” 
39 The severity of the situation has, however, been questioned, notably by Werner Abelshauser (1975). He 
pointed to figures such as the productive potential (stock of capital and labor), which at the end of the war 
remained eleven percent higher than in 1936. I find this argument somewhat analogous to telling a man 
who has lost both arms and legs “At least you still have your health.” 
40 The population density of West Germany in 1950 was 502 per square mile, compared to 380.5 in the old 
1937 Reich boundaries and just 51 per square mile in the US. (Tuchtfeldt, 1955: 61) 
41 For a more immaculate historical rendering of this time period see Nicholls (1994) chp. 5, Laqueur, 
(1992) Parts 1 & 2, Abelshauser (2004) Teil II, and Bark & Gress (1989) p. 5-74 among others.  
  20 that the Nazi Zwangswirtschaft edifice had to be replaced. The question remained, 
however, with what? Ordoliberals already agreed on basic principles, and went about 
assertively advancing a free market system based on immediate monetary reform and the 
cessation of quotas, price fixing, rationing and centralized controls, all the while 
remaining vigilant about harmful power concentrations at both private and public levels.  
 
Ordoliberal academics pushed their agenda in both the scholarly and popular press. 
Röpke wrote a vicious polemic, “Die deutsche Frage”
42 in 1945, in which he slammed 
Germany’s recent totalitarian history and examined the “deeper causes of the German 
disaster.” He wrote, “National Socialism was not a Dragon lurking in the primeval forests 
of Germany, but a national variety of a larger zoological species called Totalitarianism, 
which, for the first time in our modern age, had been bred in Russia in 1917.” (Röpke, 
1946: 513) He thus identified economic collectivism as the root evil, condemning the 
“weak, dishonest or stupid” in the academic profession who had tamely acquiesced to the 
1933 collectivization. Röpke’s full wrath fell on those (especially “Prussian” bureaucrats) 
who continued to assert centralized economic planning after the War. His withering and 
often vitriolic attacks were echoed, albeit more gently, by Eucken, who wrote several 
levelheaded critiques of central controls.
43 One of Eucken’s students, Leonhard Miksch, 
was well placed at the British central economics administration in Minden, which he used 
as a platform to emphasize the disasters of planning and the promise of free market 
alternatives. (Nicholls, 1994: 171-72) In 1947, he published a book entitled Wettbewerb 
als Aufgabe
44 which reiterated Ordoliberal principles while focusing in more detail on the 
exact threats to “full competition”. Such efforts exemplified an Ordoliberal intellectual 
movement that promoted a common agenda and offered proposals to counter problems of 
the day. 
 
A wide variety of personalities opposed the liberal position. Each endorsed some form of 
planned economics. Perhaps the most militant socialist was the union leader Viktor 
Agartz, who would accept little less than complete state economic consolidation and 
political centralization. Although in a position of power as head of the Bizonal Economic 
Administration in 1947, he survived only six months because of quarrel with Allied 
authorities over his proposed nationalization of coal. (Giersch et.al, 1994: 33) Opposing 
Agartz’s Marxist approach, the prominent economist Gerhard Weisser published Form 
und Wesen der Einzelwirtschaften
45 in 1947, which asserted the need for both devolved 
markets and centralized direction. He distinguished between levels of economic activity – 
the individual, the group, and the total aggregate – each of which required market 
initiative in some cases and government direction in others. (Weisser, 1947: 27) Overall, 
the approach was Keynesian in substance, positing a mix of planning and the market, 
tailored to the particular political situation of postwar Germany. Perhaps the most notable 
feature of an otherwise rather nebulous analysis, however, was Weisser’s sympathy for 
certain types of monopoly power. He distinguished in particular “free cartels” and 
                                                 
42 Translated (1946) as “The German Dust Bowl.” “The German Question” was too provocative apparently. 
43 See Eucken (1948) “What Kind of Economic and Social System?” & (1948a) “On the Theory of the 
Centrally Administered Economy: An Analysis of the German Experiment.” 
44 “Competition as the Task” 
45 “Form and Character of the Individual Economy” 
  21harmful “coercive cartels.” (ibid: 75) Taken in total, Weisser simply asserted that good 
and bad forms existed in every economic phenomenon, and an optimal society 
maximized the positive, rather than the negative. 
 
The most cohesive set of planning recommendations were to be found in Wilhelm 
Kromphardt’s 1947 publication Marktspaltung und Kernplanung in der 
Volkswirtschaft.
46 He proposed inserting market incentives into a planning framework, 
whereby ration cards issued to each person under government production prerogatives 
were passed directly to retailers and manufacturers, who would use them to purchase raw 
materials. (Kromphardt, 1947: 8-9) Thus, ration cards became a de facto currency based 
on a vaguely price-based system, although one tightly controlled by the government’s 
Producktionplan. (ibid: 10) This method, he theorized, would stop the massive 
misallocation and psychologically demoralizing nature of centrally controlled systems, 
while accommodating individual preferences. In addition, implementation was relatively 
straightforward within existing political and economic frameworks. This idea of 
Marktspaltung, or “final consumer allocation” within a planned system, proved a popular 
alternative to Ordoliberalism. 
 
The recurrent problem with all of these planning schemes, whether methodologically 
Marxist, Keynesian or “pragmatic”, was that they required targeted plans! Yet the 
optimal goals, say, for coal or pantyhose production (let alone distribution of inputs 
between the two), remained elusive. In the end, socialist-leaning academics were 
disunited over both means and ends, positing various mixtures of planning and market 
economics with diverse and often dubious objectives. While Ordoliberals marched in 
lock step (ironically perhaps), planners argued with one another. The organizational 
differences within the academic world were reenacted in political reality.  
 
4.1.3. Politics: As economic problems continued to mount, politicians were afforded the 
unique Stunde Null or “Zero Hour” opportunity to start anew.
47 By the time of Viktor 
Agartz’s acrimonious exit in the summer of 1947, the Bizone Economic Administrative 
Authority of the combined American and British areas was well established as the 
economic decision-making body. (Nicholls, 1994: 178) At its head was a Bavarian 
Christian Social (CSU) politician, Johannes Semler, who proved to be a wishy-washy 
supporter of both liberal reforms and the entrenched dirigisme culture, depending, it 
seemed, on the audience. Under his auspices, however, a new council of economists from 
various backgrounds was proposed, such that a balanced ‘objective’ body of 
internationally respected experts could provide legitimacy for Semler’s politicking amidst 
Allied indifference and frequent hostility.
48 (ibid: 185) The administrative task of 
choosing participants and organizing meetings fell to a liberal-leaning economist and 
Bizone authority, Dr. Hans Möller. Semler’s objectives for the Beirat were to remain 
secret, however, as he was cashiered over an amusing, at least in retrospect, 
                                                 
46 “Market-Splitting and Core Planning in the Economy” 
47 Academic conscience again compels mention of Abelshauser, who continued his assault on the popular Zero 
Hour understanding, most recently in a chapter entitled “Keine Stunde Null” (2004: 22-28).  
48 This council was technically named the Wissenschaftlicher Beirats bei der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft des 
Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes. Henceforth, Beirat will suffice. 
  22 misunderstanding with American authorities in late January 1948.
49 (Giersch et. al, 1994: 
34) Consequently, the “Beirat” experts met to discuss Germany’s economic future at the 
same time a new economic leader was to be chosen.      
 
Möller and his remaining staff brought together a veritable “Who’s Who” of economists, 
both from within and outside the then governing administrative authority. Inaugural 
meetings were held in Königstein on January 23
rd and 24
th, 1948. Ordoliberalism was 
represented by a contingent of “Freiburgers”: Eucken, Böhm, Adolf Lampe, Erwin von 
Beckerath and Miksch, as well as other liberal sympathizers: Rittershausen, Möller, 
Theodor Wessels and Müller-Armack. The most famous “planners” were also in 
attendance: including Weisser, Kromphardt, Erich Preiser, a young professor from 
Hamburg named Karl Schiller, the strong SPD unionist leader Otto Veit, in addition to a 
cadre of Minden planners such as Günther Keiser and Helmut Meinhold. Occupying the 
middle “swing position,” were Walter Strauß, Hans Peter, Oswald von Nell-Breuning and 
Otto Hoffmann. (Möller Archive, Band 31)  
 
Semler opened the proceedings with what proved to be his farewell address: 
 
We are all devoting ourselves to questions such as “Where is our economy going?” To what extent can it 
work by itself and to what extent must it be provided for by state economic administration?…Can the 
economy operate alone in the interests of the population at large and to what extent is the state and 
administration forced, for its part, to undertake direction of the economy? To what extent…will it be 
necessary…to reform the relationship of the state to the individual? (in Nicholls, 1994; 186-87) 
 
Ordoliberals’ emphatic position was aptly summarized as a “Sprung ins kalte Wasser.”
50 
It entailed a familiar three-pronged plan: a) currency reform, b) the cessation of all 
price/production controls and c) the control of monopoly power. Rittershausen, Eucken, 
Miksch and Lampe made the case for immediate monetary reform, citing the dismal 
conditions of barter exchange and repressed inflation, both consequences of a 
malfunctioning price system. Any attempt to continue arrangements of fixed prices, 
Rittershausen said, was “a nearly unrealizable work of art.”
51 (Nicholls, 1994: 188) 
Keiser and Weisser countered, however, that to let prices loose would simply exacerbate 
bottlenecks. To this Miksch responded that bottlenecks stemmed from the controls in the 
first place. He further declared, “The currency reform will already be a total failure if the 
controlled economy has to be kept going after the reform has taken place.” (ibid: 191) 
Limiting concentrations of power also sparked debate. Böhm offered forceful voice on 
the subject, and Rittershausen stated somewhat hyperbolically: “Only if it is possible in 
the future to be confident that there can in all circumstances be a method of controlling 
monopolies and positions of market dominance (wirtschaftliche Vormachtstellungen), 
will we be able to find a basis on which to unite all parties in Germany.” (ibid: 188)  
 
                                                 
49 Semler made an unfortunate word choice with “Hühnerfutter” in criticizing US food aid. He was alluding 
to unnecessary shipments of corn and other such foodstuffs that Germans could (or would) not eat directly. 
It was translated, however, as “chicken feed,” which offended the magnanimous Allied victors. 
50 “Leap into cold water” or the immediate, no-holds-barred transition to a free market economy. 
51 ein kaum zu leistendes Kunststück 
  23Socialists proposed counter-plans, many based on Kromphardt’s ‘final consumer 
allocation’ ideas. Karl Schiller offered a notable variant. He envisioned the state as a 
monopolistic power devoted to optimal allocations by rewarding resources to firms with 
the lowest costs. Thus, a mixed system of competitive cost schedules would determine 
the distribution of resources, while the state reserved the final word in setting national 
output and employment goals.
52 (ibid: 194) Socialists also pointed out that impending 
Marshall Plan aid presumed a centrally administered approach, as the U.S. required 
concrete economic plans and European-wide coordination before disbursing funds. 
(Giersch et. al; 1994: 96-97)   
 
Although not recognized at the time, many of the socialist’s plans reflected Keynes’ 
ideals, with market forces combined with frequent government intervention to preserve 
full employment, affordable pricing schemes, and growth targets. The inherent problem, 
however, was that no matter how well reasoned such ideas were, they posited at least the 
partial perpetuation of defunct war controls still in place. It was much less persuasive to 
argue that the current planning and price fixing were a disaster, but this other (similar) 
type of planning and price fixing would work. Those who advocated a total overhaul, the 
‘leap into cold water,’ held a rhetorical advantage. By the end of the first day, Franz 
Böhm was elected chairman of the Beirat and Ordoliberal opinions represented the 
majority. (Nicholls, 1994: 191)    
 
Simultaneous with the ascension of Ordoliberalism as the guiding doctrine for reform in 
the Beirat, Ludwig Erhard was chosen as Semler’s replacement in the Bizone. He brought 
distinct liberal credentials and a dogged persistence to the post. His unabashedly liberal 
ideas, however, inspired much incredulity, especially among the entrenched Minden 
authorities. Twelve days into Erhard’s term on April 18, 1948, the Beirat issued its final 
memorandum. Ending the 1936 price freezes and introducing immediate monetary reform 
were the main proposals, followed by an abolition of all controls on industrial production 
save those on import licenses. Just as important, however, was the content of 
recommendation 12: “To prevent the abuse of economic power the Beirat believes the 
immediate and effective control of monopolies and their pricing policy to be 
indispensable.” (Nicholls, 1994: 204-5) These admonishments echoed Erhard’s views 
(Goldschmidt, 2004: 12) and provided the domestic intellectual legitimacy he required to 
implement his policies without delay.       
 
In retrospect, the Beirat’s debate was a microcosm of the political and intellectual climate 
in 1948 West Germany. Opinion was firmly divided between Ordoliberals and various 
planners, yet those supporting free markets benefited from an academic consensus and 
their unambiguous opposition to existing planning schemes. In the battle of ideas, 
postwar Germany proved the ideal political and economic environment in which to assert 
the Ordoliberal agenda.   
  
 
                                                 
52 Twenty years later, as we shall see, a variant of this same “Globalsteurung” approach would again 
resurface in German economic policy. 
  24 4.2. Time Period 2 (1948-1952) “Social Market Economy”   
  
4.2.1. Historical Situation – On June 20, 1948 the Bizone implemented a radical 
monetary reform. The Deutsche Mark (DM) replaced the Reichsmark with a conversion 
ratio that was drastically scaled according to the character of the debts, from zero (public 
debts), 6.5 percent (bank deposits and reserves), 10 percent (mortgages and private debt) 
all the way to a 1:1 per capita exchange rate for the first 40 DM. (Hardach, 1980: 107) 
Therefore, every individual was extended 40 DM (with 20 more two months later) and 
firms were granted 60 DM per employee. Public authorities collected the equivalent of 
one month’s revenue. (Giersch et. al, 1994: 36) In total, 93.5 percent of the former 
monetary stock was withdrawn from circulation, with more than 400 billion in RM 
claims and liabilities nullified. (Braun, 1990: 155) Along with the actual currency reform, 
Erhard’s liberalizations took effect. On the twentieth, 400 items were immediately 
removed from the list of controlled commodities. By July 1948, ninety percent of the 
previously existing price controls were abolished, formally ending the 1936 price freeze. 
(Stolper et. al, 1967: 228)   
 
The immediate results of the reform remain a thing of lore. “Almost overnight, shops 
were again full of goods that had not been seen for years; production rose by 50 percent 
within six months, and in the following year it increased by an additional 25 percent.” 
(Laqueur, 1992: 82) The mere hint of a stable money provided the impetus necessary for 
long-repressed consumer tendencies to manifest in force. It also brought the rampant 
black market above board, such that huge stocks of horded goods were instantaneously 
transferred into the legitimate economy. (Braun, 1990: 155) This eruption of consumer 
demand led to massive increases in production and jobs creation in a short period of time.  
 
Not all the consequences were favorable. Despite a huge monetary contraction, the 
massive unleashing of consumer demand was immediately reflected in prices. Four 
months after the reform, consumer prices rose at an annualized rate of 33.1 percent, while 
producer prices skyrocketed 45 percent. (Giersch et. al, 1994: 42) Labor unions declared 
a general strike on November 12, 1948, agitating for the resumption of price controls. 
(Hardach, 1980: 108) Economic authorities did not flinch, however, realizing that short-
term inflation was inevitable in an economy where prices had been frozen at unnaturally 
low levels for twelve years. In addition, the growth of consumer demand (which caused 
prices to rise in the first place) meant handsome profits for industry, which began 
investing and expanding production. By 1949, the first threat to the market economy, 
inflation, was over. (Stolper, 1967: 230)   
 
A second major challenge emerged with unemployment. Employment seemed to increase 
steadily – from June to December 1948, by 230,000 new jobs alone – yet the net 
statistics, given the colossal influx of refugees, remained dismal. Despite annual growth 
rates of over 25%, the West German economy could not produce jobs quickly enough. At 
its peak, the unemployment rate was 12.2 percent in March 1950. (Giersch et. al, 1994: 
46) Once again, Erhard and the other Ordoliberal policymakers did not blink from the 
barrage of Keynesian criticism and dire predictions of impending economic and social 
  25implosion.
53 They stood behind the maintenance of price stability and economic non-
intervention, rejecting short-term fiscal employment stimulus.     
 
By 1950, the crisis of the pre-Reform German economy was mostly resolved. However, 
one major sector remained rigidly controlled: the current account (imports/exports and 
the balance of payments.) The Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA) was the Bizone’s 
foreign trade authority from 1947 onward. It organized its negotiations in two categories. 
The first concerned goods that satisfied the basic needs of the West German populace, 
such as food, energy, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural supplies. This was financed at 
first by the Allied authority and later by Marshall Plan funds. “Category B,” or the raw 
materials for industrial production, had to be paid for in dollars earned from export 
earnings or trade within the European economic area. (Braun, 1990: 156) War-torn 
Europe had a hard time coming up with exportable goods, and there was a chronic dollar 
shortage. This disequilibrium was acute in West Germany, where the current account 
deficit totaled 158 million dollars in 1949 and 243 million in 1950. (ibid: 157) This 
deterioration led to the European Payment Union (EPU), which together with the 
Marshall Plan sought to liberalize trade relations among European countries. In essence, 
an aggregation of Europe’s current account balance verses the United States occurred. 
Each country was granted a certain amount of multilateral credits, which diminished 
European reliance on physical dollars to conduct trade with one another. In retrospect, the 
very concept of a rigid quota-based current account system to encourage free trade 
produced a paradox. Indeed, Erhard was a vociferous opponent of the scheme, and the 
JEIA was one of his favorite targets. (Nicholls, 1994: 211) 
 
Simultaneous with the founding of the EPU in June 1950, war broke out on the Korean 
Peninsula. A resurgence of war demand in the USA created a drastic balance of payments 
crisis in Germany. After only two months, Germany had exhausted 60 percent of its 
annual EPU quota, as a rapidly expanding economy demanded larger amounts of 
imported resources in an increasingly competitive international marketplace. In June of 
1950 Germany’s deficit in the EPU area was 7 million dollars, but by early October the 
debt rose to 71 million. (Giersch, et. al, 1994: 102) Erhard did not waiver from his 
liberalizing agenda, optimistically predicting the crisis would soon pass.
54 Indeed, the 
Korean War and its ensuing boom stimulated global demand, placing Germany’s 
increasingly reconstructed industry in the perfect position to export to the rest of the 
world. (Stolper, 1967: 233) By the end of 1951, the current account rose to a 392 million 
dollar surplus, a remarkable swing of 635 million dollars in one year. (Braun, 1990: 157) 
The Ordo-liberal inspired Social Market Economy weathered yet another storm. 
 
By 1952, the Soziale Marktwirtschaft was firmly entrenched. It had transformed the 
economy overnight and bested initial inflation, unemployment, and a balance of 
payments crisis. The stage was set for “Wirtschaftswunder.” 
                                                 
53 The academic substance of these critiques will be thoroughly discussed in the next section. 
54 After an internal spat of some ferociousness, an investment plan was enacted in January 1952 (by which 
time the crisis was over). It allowed for government investment of DM 1 billion in large concerns such as 
coal, steel, and electricity. (Van Hook, 2004: 228)  Abelshauser (2004: 166) characterized the event as a 
“retreat to the Corporate Social Market Economy” and the functional end of liberal policy in the FRG.  
  26 4.2.2. Academia – “Währungsreform” (monetary reform) was a much-debated topic in 
post war Germany. A surfeit of proposals surfaced on the issue: from the watershed 
Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith act, to the numerous separate “plans;” including the Warenmark, 
Lampe, Hoffmann, Pfleiderer, Ilau, Dalberg and Keiser designs. Advisory opinions 
(Gutachten) were issued by Eucken and Miksch on one side of the ideological spectrum 
and Veit and Schumacher on the other. (Möller, 1961) When Erhard pushed through the 
reform on June 20, 1948, it was crafted and implemented mostly by the Western Allied 
authorities. (Giersch et. al, 1994: 36) However, Americans and the British did not control 
the intellectual agenda. Erhard embodied the Ordoliberal vanguard, forcefully asserting 
an end of controls to coincide with the increasingly successful currency reform. On June 
22 he declared, “The entire body of economic legislation which has hitherto governed 
trade and industry in the combined American and British Zones of Occupation is to be 
completely terminated – at least in regard to controls and prices…A wide measure of 
agreement has been obtained on the need to annul the bulk of the current legal provisions 
to coincide with the Currency Reform.” (Erhard, 1948: 31) 
 
Perhaps Erhard’s “wide measure of agreement” referred to the academic Beirat 
recommendations, but it was clear that significant resistance remained to his liberal 
machinations. The famously eccentric
55 Die Zeit journalist Countess Dönhoff wrote in 
1948 “If Germany were not already ruined, this man, with his absurd plan to abolish all 
controls, would certainly bring that ruin about. God protect us from him ever becoming 
Economics Minister. That would be the third catastrophe after Hitler and the 
dismemberment of Germany.” (in Nicholls, 1994: 212) More concrete criticism emanated 
from prominent socialists like Eduard Heimann, who lamented the transitional costs of 
Erhard’s “leap into cold water,” which included unpleasantly high unemployment: 
 
Professor Erhard, Economics Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany…has proceeded to demolish 
economic controls in that impoverished country in the frankly expressed belief that some unemployment is 
a good thing for the economic system. The Marxist theory of the industrial reserve army as indispensable 
for capitalism and profit is thus accepted by the modern liberals, and they choose capitalism rather than full 
employment. (Heimann, 1950: 273) 
 
Heimann was indicative of a “class warfare” critic, many of whom labeled Erhard’s 
liberalizing as an inevitable return to Laissez faire robber-baron capitalism. On the 
academic side, a kindred socialist spirit, Erich Preiser, wrote critiques in a more 
Keynesian vein. His article “The Social Problems of the Market Economy”
56 favored 
government interventions, such as directed infrastructure and capital investment to 
resolve “real structural and systematically chronic unemployment.”
57 (Preiser, 1951: 17) 
He proposed a Keynesian scheme of pre-financing investment through money creation. 
(Giersch et. al, 1994: 56) Only after full-employment policies were implemented, was 
one “allowed” to speak of a socialistic Market Economy.
58 (ibid: 25)  
                                                 
55  See her famous autobiography (1988) Kindheit in Ostpreussen, (Berlin: Siedler Verlag) 
56 “Die soziale Problematik der Marktwirtschaft” Incidentally, it was written as a response to Franz Böhm’s 
influential article “Die Aufgaben der freien Marktwirtschaft.”    
57 “Die echte strukturelle Arbeitslosigkeit und eine systembedingte chronische Arbeitslosigkeit” 
58 “Nur wer sich dieser Gesamtaufgabe bewusst ist, darf von sozialer Marktwirschaft sprechen.” Notice the 
subtle response to Böhm’s title by using the term “Gesamtaufgabe.” (or Total challenges)   
  27Karl Schiller also published profusely, focusing his critiques on governmental non-
intervention and the lack of macro controls. In a 1951 lecture, Schiller highlighted the 
four largest problems existing in the economy: 1) the unacceptable span separating 
production indices and synchronized investment 2) the pervasive investment difficulties 
of the “ordnungspolitische Wirtschaftsverfassung” in optimally apportioning raw 
materials 3) the disproportionate income distribution between the different Länder which 
was also a problem of effective investment and 4) the worsening of Germany’s “terms of 
trade” relative to other European countries (stemming from the Korean Boom’s price-
relations), damaging external trade balances, which Schiller labeled as Germany’s 
greatest threat. (Schiller, 1951: 7)
59 He thus proclaimed the debate over government 
direction “in the blink of an eye” became obsolete.
60 It was obvious to him that the 
market alone could not solve these problems; government involvement was required to 
guide investment, income distribution and the external trade balance. 
 
Despite these protests to Erhard’s deregulation and non-intervention, Ordoliberals held 
the trump card and that was success. Their ideas had been implemented and flourished. 
As Erhard stated triumphantly ten weeks after the Reform: 
 
Prior to the Currency Reform, the economy could no longer be described as functioning properly. A highly 
developed and sophisticated market had relapsed into the methods of a primitive barter economy as a result of 
the monetary chaos and the megalomaniacal (sic) insolence of the bureaucrats in our centrally controlled 
economy. All orderly forms of production had ceased. What remained was a soulless jumble of frightened 
individuals, devoid of any sense of responsibility, with everyone solely concerned to cling to his or her 
individual existence. In the meantime, we have overcome this situation. It seems like a miracle – although it 
was just judicious planning in the best sense of the term – that we managed to master this social chaos within 
a matter of days thanks to a new currency and a resolute shift in economic policy. (Erhard, 1948a: 36) 
 
The critics of Ordoliberalism simply could not compete with the basic tenets of market 
allocation, which had indeed proved to be the antidote to the hated Zwangswirtschaft.  
Planners were thus thrust into intellectual disarray. Some continued to fulminate the 
hackneyed Marxist collectivization doctrine while others, such as Preiser and Schiller, 
adopted overt Keynesian motifs. This internal division of the left transferred into the 
political realm, ensuring the Ordoliberal grip on politics for years to come. 
 
The period of 1948-1952 proved to be the Ordoliberal heyday. Their ideas garnered 
practical legitimacy, outpacing other schools of thought. Liberal ebullience would be cut 
short, however, by the early deaths of the “father” of Ordoliberalism, Walter Eucken, and 
his well-connected student, Leonhard Miksch, in 1950. These two staunch “defenders of 
the faith” would be missed.   
 
4.2.3. Politics – The first democratic elections for West Germany’s future government 
were held on August 14, 1949. They featured a pitched battle between a pre-war party, 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the newly formed Christian Democratic Union 
                                                 
59 Interesting here is the overt challenge to Ordoliberalism, as Schiller posits only the state is able to 
optimally determine overall investment. He cites the British Socialist T. Balogh’s Germany: An Experiment 
in “Planning” by the “Free” Price Mechanism (Blackwell, Oxford) as evidence that even after 18 months 
“new bottlenecks” continued to appear in the economy. (Schiller, 1951: 11) 
60 “Ein Problem ‘Lenkung, ja oder nein’ existiert also im Augenblick nicht mehr.” 
  28 (CDU).
61 Unsurprisingly, the major debate hinged on economic policy. Erhard’s success 
was already well advertised in the voting populace, but the SPD continued to assail his 
“social market economy” as a disgrace to their word, the appropriation of which masked 
a process whereby discredited capitalist forces and old Nazi industrialists were returning 
to power. (Nicholls, 1997: 68) The SPD and its fiercely dynamic leader, Kurt 
Schumacher, utilized the tried and true capitalism vs. socialism campaign rhetoric. By 
1949, however, Erhard’s program was already an unequivocal success, and in his 
statements he espoused a vernacular that eschewed Marxist jargon. He spoke endlessly of 
markets, competition and freedom. The SPD alienated many voters who felt genuinely 
liberated and more prosperous.   
 
Konrad Adenauer, the former Lord Mayor of Cologne and head of the CDU, noticed 
Erhard’s popularity and invited him to join the CDU, proposing that the Social Market 
Economy become the permanent economic platform of the party. The “Düsseldorf 
Principles” of July 1949 enshrined Erhard’s policies as the official party program. In 
August, German voters cast ballots for their first parliament. Of 31.2 million eligible 
voters, 24.5 participated (78.5 percent) with the results as follows: CDU/CSU 31%, SPD 
29.2 %, the Free Democrats (FDP) 11.9% and the twelve other parties and independents 
27.9 percent.
62 (Bark & Gress, 1989: 243) The political legitimization of Erhard’s 
program passed by less than two percent, although a later coalition of the CDU with the 
FDP (among others) expedited governmental workings.  
 
Many in the SPD, especially Schumacher, were enraged by the results of the election. It 
was an affront to their dignity, to have suffered so much during the Nazi time only to be 
removed from economic decision-making. During Schumacher’s post-election rants, 
however, he confirmed the SPD’s socialist leanings, sticking to the complete socialization 
of natural resources and heavy industry. (Bark & Gress, 1989: 244) His opposition to 
Adenauer was impassioned; there was even an incident in late 1949 when he was banned 
from Bundestag debate for several days after violating parliamentary procedure. 
(Nicholls, 1997: 90) Shut out of government and increasingly rebuffed by German voters 
and the Allied authorities, the SPD struggled to compete with the Adenauer government. 
In 1953’s election, the CDU/CSU/FDP received 56.7% of the vote, increasing their 
majority in the Bundestag by exactly 100 seats. 
 
4.3. Time Period 3: (1952-1960) “Wirtschaftswunder”  
 
4.3.1. Historical Situation – A sense of fond nostalgia for the 1950’s remains engraved 
in the collective German memory. The numbers were truly astounding, worthy of the 
                                                 
61 Along with their allied Bavarian wing, the CSU. 
62 By zones, the CDU gained 67, 45 and 27 seats in the British, U.S. and French zones, respectively, while the 
SPD won a corresponding 78, 41 and 12 respectively. (Heidenheimer: 177) This is interesting, as essentially, 
it was the French zone (the area not immediately in the Bizone authority) that won the election for the CDU. 
 
 
  29label “economic miracle.”
63 (See Figure 1) For the decade, annual GDP growth averaged 
8.3 percent, with unemployment falling from 11 percent in 1950 to 1.3% in 1960 despite 
a population increase of 5 million people. Real wages also increased at a healthy average 
rate of 6.8 percent. Most unusual for a period of explosive growth, decreasing 
unemployment and strong wage growth, prices did not rapidly increase. Inflation 
averaged 1.36% over the decade. Wage gains were therefore transferred almost intact to 
consumers. High GDP and population growth, low unemployment, wage increases, and 


















1950  -  11  50,958  136  26.4  - 
1951  9.7 10.4 51,435  153  28.4 12.24 
1952  9.3  9.5  51,864  167  29  9.36 
1953  8.9 8.4 52,454  176  28.5 5.38 
1954  7.8  7.6  52,943  180  28.6  2.27 
1955  12.1 5.6 53,518  193  29  7.01 
1956  7.7  4.4  53,340  209  29.8  8.14 
1957  6.1 3.7 54,064  220  30.4 5.18 
1958  4.5  3.7  54,719  231  31.1  4.97 
1959  7.9 2.6 55,257  244  31.3 5.51 
1960  8.6  1.3  55,958  264  31.8  8.00 
 
* GDP price adjusted: chain-linked index (year 2000 = 100) 
** Average gross monthly earnings (in present euro) 
† Consumer price index for 4-person-households with medium income wage earners (1995 = 100) 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, http://www.destatis.de/  
                                                 
63 The 1950s economic boom was not, however, a unique German phenomenon. The decade witnessed 
healthy, but not “miracle” growth in most Western countries: 
 
Country  Ave. GNP Growth 1949-54  Ave. GNP Growth 1954-59 
West Germany  8.4  6.6 
Austria  5.7 5.7 
Italy  6.4  5.7 
France  4.8 4.1 
Belgium  3.7  2.5 
Great Britain  2.7 2.3 
Denmark  3.7  3.4 
Switzerland  5.7 4.6 
Finland  5.3  3.5 
The Netherlands  4.9 4.1 
USA  3.6  3.3 
 
Source: Abelshauser (1975) pp. 12 
 
64 All figures from Statistisches Bundesamt, http://www.destatis.de; author’s calculations 
  30 While we recognize in retrospect the 1950’s economic performance as an extraordinary 
circumstance,
65 continuing prosperity infused ordinary Germans with an infectious 
optimism.
66 Although only a decade removed from postwar economic disaster, the 
Ordoliberal lessons were rapidly being pushed to the back burner. There was a tendency 
to forget the original importance of limited government intervention.   
 
The drastic turn around of Germany’s economy also affected the fiscal picture. By 1952, 
a country with long institutionalized memory of massive deficits had balanced its national 
accounts. In 1955, Bonn was running a 1.3% surplus, the accumulation of which was 
invested by Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer at the central bank with an eye towards 
reconstituting Germany’s military. Excess revenues became known as the Juliusturm 
(Julius Tower), a reference to the fortress where Prussian kings had stored their war 
booty. (Braun, 1990; 179) The figurative “piles of cash” further eroded the sacrificing 
Sprung ins kalte Wasser mentality of politicians and citizens. Ordoliberal successes bred 
complacency and apathy; economic triumph paradoxically signaled doctrinal irrelevance. 
In the eyes of many, and certainly an increasingly reformed SPD, the time had come to 
apportion the spoils of Wirtschaftswunder. Newfound thriving circumstances seemed to 
demand, illogically, a reappraisal of the hitherto Ordoliberal policy. 
 
4.3.2. Academia – Socialist thinkers and politicians were forced to swallow their 
previous theorizing and politicking during the implementation of Erhard’s Social Market 
Economy. Not only were Ordoliberal ideas proving economically successful, but 
electorally-speaking, the old collectivist ideals were being trounced at the polls. Wilhelm 
Röpke summarized the socialist’s dilemma: “Ludwig Erhard and his group stepped into a 
situation of so-called repressed inflation which was really nothing less than the stark and 
complete bankruptcy of inflationary collectivism, countered with a resolute return to the 
market economy and monetary discipline. What is more, Erhard was unsporting enough 
to succeed beyond all expectations.” (Röpke, 1960: 23) Gisbert Rittig termed it the 
“Crisis of Socialism.” (Rittig, 1955: 5) Socialists required fresh ideas that could unite, 
reinvigorate, and inspire people in both intellectual and political circles. 
 
At the forefront of this redefinition was the now famous professor from Hamburg, Karl 
Schiller. As early as the Beirat debates he had become an advocate of the Keynesian 
“mixed” economy, with macro planning added to individual initiative. During the 1950’s, 
his ideas solidified. In 1953, he published Challenges and Trials: to a New Order for 
Society and Economics,
67 a compilation of his lectures. In it, he laid the groundwork for 
the “practical character of our economic policy from a socialist standpoint.”(Schiller, 
1953: 139)
68 It eschewed what Schiller vividly called the “sinister and ghastly experiment 
                                                 
65 Relating, as Abelshauser wrote, to the reconstruction of a destroyed Germany (2004: 281). 
66 See Haselbach (1998). He asserted that in a post-Nazi society stripped of nationalism and an acceptable 
unifying culture, economic success attained symbolic significance in the recreated “German identity.”  
When a downturn did eventually occur, however, it was therefore not just economic in nature, but a direct 
attack on the new German identity, making policy responses emotionally charged and often irrational. 
67 Aufgabe und Versuche: Zur Neuen Ordnung von Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft 
68 “Thesen zur praktischen Gestaltung unserer Wirtschaftspolitik aus sozialistischer Sicht”  
  31with totalitarian socialist systems”
 69 in favor of a free market with full competition. (ibid: 
140) The complete implementation of Ordoliberal ideas, however, was not desirable. In 
the end, the state remained responsible for “coordinating” the total economy. (ibid: 144) 
 
Protecting the democratic process, Schiller claimed, could not be left to impersonal 
market forces, and all possible tools necessary to achieve a better social coordination 
should be at the macro planner’s disposal. (Schiller, 1953: 166-7) One source of abuse 
was the over-concentration of market power. Like the Ordoliberals, Schiller continually 
returned to this point, except that he wanted the government to assert a more proactive 
(instead of just a regulatory) role. With a centralized investment plan and an 
“expansionary stability mechanism,” the government could approach full competition 
policy with unbounded capabilities. (Schiller, 1968: 58) Ordoliberal approaches, on the 
other hand, treated competition policy like a “muted trumpet,” they lacked macro stability 
and direction tools necessary to complete the job.
iii This proved to be a shrewd political 
argument, as it coincided intellectually (albeit not in the policy realm) with the views of 
Erhard, thus blurring the line between Ordoliberal and Keynesian philosophy.  
 
Schiller was less receptive to Ordoliberal worries concerning inflation. Their logic, he 
noted, was premised on a mistaken historical anxiety; contrary to the situation after the 
First World War in which massive reparations were paid by the printing press, in 1945 all 
war debts were nullified. Thus, he concluded that democracy was secure.
iv Policy makers 
could use expansionary monetary and fiscal tools to guide the new, financially stable 
democracy, options which were absent in the interwar period. Why then deny the nascent 
West Germany potentially useful Keynesian policies? Optimally, there would be a 
staatliche Preispolitik that emphasized a systematic Wirtschaftsplanung input-output 
analysis.
70 (ibid: 146-7) He concluded in language that could be mistaken for the 
ecumenically-inclined Eucken or Müller-Armack; market freedom and government-
directed ordering were intertwined in a “Higher Bond” that Christian values and social 
brotherhood endorsed. They could not be separated.
v
 
Schiller’s colleagues remained unclear about the basic premises of his ‘new socialism,’ 
which he characterized as “market forces where possible; planning where necessary,”
71 
so he published another pamphlet entitled Socialism and Competition.
72 In it, Schiller 
tackled the persistent question “what is socialism?” By way of an answer, he conceived 
of merging free markets and social prerogatives through comprehensive income, price, 
tax, and full employment policy. (Schiller, 1955: 32-33) In the new socialism, the 
leitmotif was providing equal opportunity for all to participate in the market economy and 
reap its benefits. Government ownership with its authoritarian dictation of micro 
                                                 
69 “unheimlichen und grausamen Experimente totalitär-sozialistischer System” 
70 Schiller’s italicized German is especially emphatic here, stressing the need for State price policy and 
central economic planning. 
71 “Wettbewerb soviel wie möglich, Planung soviel wie nöltig” (Schiller, 1955: 29) Technically, the 
translation is “Competition as far as possible, planning as far as necessary” but variations on the theme 
occur with regularity. The statement is often cited (inaccurately perhaps) as the “summing-it-all-up” 
philosophic phrase behind the Social Market Economy. (see Laqueur: 206) 
72 Sozialismus und Wettbewerb, (1955) 
  32 incentives and production quotas were passé; socialism was defined as pursuing socially-
oriented macro goals by means of market allocation. 
 
Schiller was not the only prominent academic to advance a mix of government planning 
and free markets as the new social alternative. Astonishingly, given the author’s previous 
devotion to total state control and planning, Gerhard Weisser wrote an article in 1956 
entitled “The Multifarious Ways of Social Life.”
73 He wrote, “Democracy is an 
indispensable postulate from the standpoint of every free political movement; but it alone 
is not enough to vouchsafe the freedom of social existence.” 
vi (Weisser, 1956: 168) 
Government intervention was needed to complement the basic democratic and 
individualistic market economy, until the social character of life was guaranteed, thereby 
truly ensuring universal freedom.   
 
Erich Preiser was also a Keynesian convert. In a volume of essays on business cycles in 
the postwar world, Preiser and his assistant Wilhelm Krelle attempted to refute the 
traditional analysis of the German miracle “that all investment in Germany so far has 
been autonomous;” i.e., Germany’s sudden recovery was achieved without centralized 
demand management. (Preiser & Krelle, 1955: 123) In their argument, the authors 
reinterpreted Erhard’s Ordoliberal miracle as the sum product of various Keynesian 
stimuli, both fiscal and monetary. Traditional socialists began to rationalize Ordoliberal 
successes in terms of Keynesian logic. 
 
To begin with, they reevaluated June 20, 1948: “the creation of money connected with 
the currency reform led to a significant expansion of consumer demand, to increases in 
prices and production, and to high profits.”
 (ibid: 147) This observation was right out of a 
Keynesian textbook; inflate the money supply and consumer demand increases.
 74 The 
next year witnessed, however, only modest intervention, and thus little progress:  
 
The period between the spring of 1949 and the spring of 1950 may briefly be characterized as a period of 
general return to normal economic conditions. It was marked by rising output, falling prices, slightly falling 
profits and unchanged investment; while employment did not continue to rise, it did not fall either, yet 
unemployment increased. (Preiser & Krelle, 1955: 149)  
 
In other words, the Ordoliberal’s focus on prices and reducing government controls led to 
a stagnating labor market. The following year they returned to macro fiscal management, 
including public works projects and “refinancing aid” plans.
75 (ibid: 150) “Summing up, 
it can be said that between the spring of 1950 and the summer of 1951 the upswing in the 
economy, which had been slowly induced by expansionary policies, was propelled into a 
boom by the outbreak of the conflict in Korea. The government’s program, political 
expectations, and the rise in world market prices were the essential determining factors of 
this development.” (ibid: 152) Once again, price inflation and government intervention 
were painted as the major determinants of success. Finally, a “settling down economy” 
after the summer of 1951 could be traced to government handling: 
                                                 
73 A better translation of Vielgestaltiges soziales Leben than “Polymorphic social life” 
74 Never mind that the stated methodology of the Reform drastically decreased the supply of money.  
75 In rebuttal, it might also be said that keeping a constant percentage rate of employment was actually a 
remarkable feat given a migration of 10-12 Million refugees in the decade following 1945.  
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It became more and more apparent that a further increase in the social product had become dependent upon 
the elimination of bottle-necks…A number of proposals and plans to this effect were put forward; the one 
finally chosen was the so-called Investment Aid to industry. Under this plan it was proposed to raise 1 
billion DM through contributions by firms, for the purpose of investment in bottle-neck sectors. (ibid: 153)  
 
It was thus necessary for government to step in and mitigate bottlenecked sectors. For 
Preiser, fluctuations in investment, prices, output and employment were glibly explained 
using Keynesian lingo.
76   
 
Given the rapid transition of many socialist thinkers from Marxist concepts to 
Keynesianism – and their appropriation of previously scorned ideas such as competitive 
markets in the process – one might expect a strong response from the Ordoliberal 
establishment. This did not occur. Eucken and Miksch were dead. Böhm was fully 
involved trying to see his monopoly and market power concerns through the Bundestag, 
Rüstow was ensconced writing his three-volume epic
77 and Erhard and Müller-Armack 
were too busy with quotidian matters at the Ministry of Economics to engage in academic 
debate. The only figure who picked up on the socialists’ shift (and had the time to 
sufficiently address it) was Röpke. He published a short article, “Front Lines Old and 
New in Economy Policy” in 1958: 
 
A few days ago, I received a newspaper article from Germany in which my friendly opponent of 1947 had 
written warm words of approval for the market economy, a competitive price-system and private 
ownership; and he clearly found nothing in this view that was irreconcilable with the apparently unchanged 
opinions and attitudes of a convinced Socialist. Now a change like this, made within the space of a mere ten 
years, is quite astonishing, and I am inclined to regard it as all the more significant because it is typical of 
the situation, in theory and in practice, in which the Socialist movements of the free world find themselves 
today. (Röpke, 1958: 94-5) 
 
Socialism, Röpke explained, had “shifted attack,” and now stood for the “Welfare State,” 
based on fiscal policy, full employment, and continuous wage increases. (ibid: 98) These 
interventions Röpke wrote – in direct response to the ‘bottleneck’ assertions of Preiser 
and Krelle – would prove harmful in the long run: 
 
Any increase in State interference which could deflect the market economy from the course set by 
competition and price adjustment, any excess of arbitrary rules and regulations, any curtailing of incentives, 
any official price-fixing or limitations set to the fundamental economic freedoms will lead to failures, 
bottlenecks, diminished achievement and destruction of the market equilibrium. It is true, these will be 
dealt with fairly smoothly at first. But as interference increases, so will they grow until they finally become 
                                                 
76 Preiser was not the only prominent socialist economist to rationalize economic conditions in terms of 
business cycle policy. Fritz Baade of Kiel University wrote a pamphlet in 1955, “Einige Grundsätzliche 
Gedanken zur Konjunkturdebatte” (Several Theoretical Foundations for Business Cycle Debate) in which 
he distinguished between “Orthodox” non-interventionism and “Reformer” Keynesian active policy, siding 
with the latter in terms of “mobilizing the working reserve and directing investment” (Baade, 1955: 156) 
77 Rüstow, A; (1950, 1952, 1957) Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart: Eine universalgeschichtliche 
Kulturkritik, v. 1, 2, 3. Rüstow did, however, publish an article called “Wirtschaftsethische Probleme der 
sozialen Marktwirtschaft” (Ethical Economic Problems of the Social Market Economy in Boarman, 1955) 
which included the relatively famous phrase: “Konkurrenz ist nun einmal keine Solidarität.” (Competition 
is now not social solidarity) (ibid: 54) Hardly what one would call a ringing rebuke of the socialist’s 
interventionist leanings, although Rüstow did go on to say religion and other non-economic phenomena 
should provide the necessary social glue.   
  34 a public catastrophe. And the worst of it is that these disturbances caused by State interference are put 
forward as proof of the inadequacies of the free economy itself, and taken as an excuse for still greater 
degrees of interference, while it is not everyone who can see that the fault should be laid at the door of 
interference in the first place. (Röpke, 1958: 100) 
 
In a single statement, Röpke criticized the premises of both Schiller (mix market and 
planning) and Weisser (real ‘freedom’ requires planning): 
 
True, it is certainly a step forward that the Socialists who have been converted to the idea of a free 
economy should have put forward the slogan, “market economy where possible; planning where 
necessary,” for this shifts the burden of proof onto the planner. But in applying this maxim, what becomes 
important is how much proof is required; and unfortunately the Socialist is still the sort of man whose 
spiritual constitution allows him to take the increase of constraints on society far more lightly than others – 
and this is not in the least affected by his contention that it is often in the name of freedom that he accepts 
them. (Röpke, 1958: 102) 
 
Röpke made it clear that the new socialism was just as bad as the old, perhaps even worse 
because it shrouded itself in the misleading vernacular often associated with Ordoliberal 
successes. Indeed Röpke’s assertion, essentially, that “a wolf in sheep’s clothing is still a 
wolf” was to prove prescient. 
 
The turbulent academic debate of the 1950’s was of decisive importance to the German 
political and economic situation. Recognizing a bankrupt theoretical body, Karl Schiller 
almost single-handedly transformed Marxist socialist tendencies to Keynesianism. As 
earlier noted, even when Ordoliberalism was ascendant, there was scant agreement on the 
“social” facet of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Suddenly, socialist thinkers had the answer, 
and it was Keynesianism. What better describes the mandate of a “social market 
economy” than the undeniably pragmatic statement “market whenever possible, planning 
where necessary?”  
 
4.3.3. Politics – It would be a mistake to ignore the political contributions of the SPD in 
the aftermath of their 1949 electoral loss. Despite formal exclusion from the ruling 
coalition and consistent internal wrangling over party doctrine, the SPD remained a 
forceful voice for large segments of the population, especially workers’ interests and 
unions. Nor were the Social Democrats impotent in influencing the policy-making 
process. The largest SPD victory in the early fifties was actually conceived and passed by 
CDU forces: the “Betriebsverfassungsgesetz,” or a constitutional protection of worker’s 
rights. On July 19, 1952, the Bundestag passed a law that mandated labor be represented 
(with voting rights) in any enterprise with more than five employees. The law also 
provided guarantees on liability compensation, cooperative associations (like unions), 
health insurance, and the equivalent of third representation at the corporate board 
(Aufsichtsrat) level. (Heilemann et. al; 2003: 36)  This law enshrined in German 
industrial relations the principle of Mitbestimmung or “Codetermination.” 
 
The Ordoliberals were not as enthusiastic about Mitbestimmung. The faint distinctions, in 
practice, between “co-ownership” and “co-determination” raised eyebrows. More 
troubling, the new arrangement legislated an incestuous sort of bargaining process, a 
  35circumventing of competitive wage setting (and therefore real prices).
78 The 
concentration of economic power in this manner was anathema. Yet, the idea was well-
liked among the electorate and Adenauer, whose adherence to Ordoliberalism lasted only 
insofar as they remained politically popular, seized the opportunity to make CDU inroads 
in the SPD “proletarian” constituency.
79 (Nicholls, 1994: 309-10) For the SPD, 
codetermination was an ideological coup against liberal economic policy. However, 
Adenauer’s shrewd political support for Mitbestimmung blurred the political lines for 
traditionally SPD blue-collar voters, and thus it most likely contributed to the CDU’s 
landslide victory in 1953.
80
 
In the meantime, Schiller was working to move his party towards a Keynesian economic 
platform. In the wake of their 1953 electoral collapse, the SPD met in Berlin in July of 
1954. Schiller asserted his intellectual ideas. The resulting “Berliner Aktionsprogramm”, 
however, did not officially replace SPD protocols, which continued the mostly Marxist 
party doctrine with a vaguely Keynesian bent, what Otto Veit summarized as the “Magna 
Carta of liberating the worker.” 
vii (Held, 1982: 254) Doctrinal tension within the SPD did 
not abate in Berlin. 
 
The issue of monopoly power also loomed large in the minds of Ordoliberal policy-
makers. Adenauer was in principle a firm supporter of anti-cartel legislation. He had 
previously made the break-up of companies with monopolistic characteristics – where 
economies of scale were not necessary for technical, social or economic reasons – a 
central plank of his political platform. (Schwarz, 1986; 1995: 374) It seemed that the 
CDU, which held a majority in the Bundestag and was theoretically united behind anti-
cartel legislation, would easily pass laws in this area. However, Erhard and Franz Böhm, 
who spearheaded many of the efforts, faced an uphill battle.
81 While resolutions were 
floated continuously throughout the early 1950s, not until July 1957 was a law passed. 
For one, CDU-supporting industrialists and their Verbände were opposed to such 
legislation, forcing Adenauer and Erhard to tread carefully. (Nicholls, 1994: 334) The 
question was whether the doctrinal insistence on anti-monopoly legislation would trump 
political considerations. 
 
The SPD, for its part, relished the opportunity to be a spoiler. With economic crisis firmly 
in the past, Erhard and his allies, whom the SPD derisively called the “Erhard Brigade,”
82 
could not appeal to a 1948 sense of urgency. They were reduced to rather lame warnings 
of cartel power as a potential saboteur of the Social Market Economy and Adenauer’s 
                                                 
78 This “wage inflexibility” and the codetermination bargaining process are often cited today as a major 
factor in Germany’s current labor market problems. (Siebert, 2005: 95) 
79 The CDU’s affinity for Mitbestimmungsrecht can actually be traced to its pre-Erhard, 1947 “Adenauer 
Programm.” This asserted the principle of distributive power (machtverteilendes Prinzip) and the right for 
codetermination on fundamental issues of “planning and social structure.” (Schwarz, 1986; 1995: 374)  
Incidentally, this platform also asserted public ownership for mines and heavy industry. (ibid)  
80 The CDU also had a strong labor wing, and this was solidified by the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz. 
81 Ordoliberal efforts were not aided by recent public remembrances of de-cartelization, a very unpopular 
American policy related, philosophically-speaking, to the infamous Morgenthau Plan. 
82 A backhanded reference to the reactionary Brigade Ehrhardt, which attempted a Putsch in March 1920. 
  36 plan to economically integrate the FRG with Western Europe. (Nicholls, 1994: 353-4) In 
a show of precisely the sort of behavior Ordoliberals wanted to prevent, powerful 
business interests, such as the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), continued 
to thwart meaningful legislation. While many in the SPD also wanted to see some sort of 
anti-cartel policy – especially framed around the putative need for macro-level planning – 
and Karl Schiller, for one, had long articulated his concerns about concentrated market 
power and “pressure groups” in an unregulated market economy, (Schiller, 1951: 14-5) 
the opposition party was content to encourage internal CDU strife, favoring whichever 
position caused the most confusion. 
 
As a result of these maneuvers, the final “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen” as 
implemented on the January 1, 1958, was a relatively weak document. It established an 
anti-cartel office and forbade price fixing and monopoly market power. (Heilemann, 
2003: 67) However, many loopholes also found their way into the final draft, including 
provisions that allowed small businesses to opt out of “price competition” and tolerated 
cartel arrangements where it made “economic sense.” (Nicholls, 1994: 336) Together 
with the Mitbestimmungsgesetz, the 1950’s solidified a corps of law that mostly 
contradicted Ordoliberal intensions concerning private concentrations of power. 
 
It would be remiss, however, to assume that the Ordoliberal program completely ran out 
of momentum. A law consolidating the Bank deutscher Länder into a strengthened central 
bank entered into effect on August 1, 1957. (Heilemann, 2003: 65) For those concerned 
with the primacy of a stable, non-inflationary currency, the new Deutsche Bundesbank 
was a major victory. “Buba” authorities enjoyed a high degree of independence. While 
members on its Board of Mangers were nominated by the Federal government to fixed 8-
year terms, the more influential Central Bank Council was chosen by Bundesbank 
representatives. Government officials were allowed to attend meetings, but only as non-
participants. Additionally, the central bank advised the Government on monetary matters, 
albeit without extending a return prerogative to Bonn. The primary task of the 
Bundesbank was, above all else, to safeguard the Deutsche Mark. (Maclennan et al, 1968: 
169) Over the next decades, the Bundesbank’s reputation would become synonymous 
with monetary stability. 
 
Throughout the 1950s Schiller and his ideological allies in the SPD attempted to move 
their party’s economic platform to Keynesianism. Success came in 1959. From 
November 13 to 15, the SPD held a congress at Bad Godesberg in order to redraft the 
German Social Democrat program for the first time since the Heidelberg meetings of 
1925, when the party had adopted the vastly outdated and vaguely embarrassing motto 
Demokratie ist nicht viel – Sozialismus ist das Ziel. (Democracy is nothing much – 
Socialism is the goal). (Bark & Gress, 1989: 445) The “Godesberger Programm” marked 
a fundamental shift in the politics of the SPD. It brought a complete overhaul, addressing 
everything from atomic bombs to physical education. The statements on economic policy, 
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Figure 2: The Godesberger Programm – Basic Policy Statement of the SPD 
 
  The goal of social democratic economic policy is to ensure, for all, growing prosperity, fair 
participation in the national economy and a life of liberty without degrading dependence or 
exploitation.    
 
  Economic Policy must secure full employment, which together with a stable currency increases 
productivity and general prosperity. 
 
  In order that everyone shares in the prosperity, the economy must adapt to constant structural 
changes according to a plan, so that balanced economic development is reached. 
 
  The modern State constantly influences the entire economy through its tax and finance decisions, 
over the money and credit systems, its tariff-, trade-, social and price strategy, its public orders as 
well as in agriculture and housing policy. More than one third of the national product is administered 
with a public hand. It is thus not a question whether [central] arrangement and planning of the 
economy is appropriate, rather in whose favor these decisions are made. The State cannot extract 
itself from this responsibility. It is responsible for a farsighted economic policy that should be 
limited to an indirect influence of the economy.  
 
  Free consumer and job choice are crucial foundations in the social democratic economic policy, as 
are free competition and entrepreneurial initiative. Autonomy for employees and employers’ 
associations through collective bargaining is also a substantial component of the liberal order. 
Totalitarian State-control destroys liberty. Therefore, the SPD affirms the free market where 
competition prevails. However, where markets are distorted by the supremacy of particular interests 
or groups, they require various interventions to uphold economic freedom. Competition as far as 
possible, planning as far as necessary!   
   




This platform could have been excerpted from Schiller’s writings over the previous 
decade. From the emphasis on complementary free market forces and Keynesian 
interventions – targeting full employment and coordinating “balanced” economic 
development – to the regulatory responsibilities of the state, the program shifted the 
underlying economic philosophy of the SPD from Marxism to Keynesianism. Schiller’s 
catch line was also unmistakable: “competition as far as possible, planning as far as 
necessary!” 
  
4.4. Time Period 4: (1960-1970) “Keynesianism” 
 
4.4.1. Historical Situation – The 1960s began as the 1950s had ended, with healthy 
(although not torrid) growth, minimal inflation, epically low unemployment, and ‘brand 
name’ recognition for the Social Market Economy all over the world. Numbers again 
help elucidate the overall picture: 
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1960  8.6  1.3  55,958  264  31.8  8.00 
1961  4.6 0.8 56,589  293  32.6 10.7 
1962  4.7  0.7  57,247  322  33.5  9.6 
1963  2.8 0.8 57,865  347  34.5  7.6 
1964  6.7  0.8  58,587  380  35.3  9.2 
1965  5.4 0.7 59,297  418  36.5  9.7 
1966  2.8  0.7  59,793  442  37.8  5.6 
1967  -0.3 2.1 59,948  440  38.4  -0.5 
1968  5.5  1.5  60,463  467  38.8  6.0 
1969  7.5 0.9 61,195  525  39.6 12.0 
1970  3.0  0.7  61,001  591  40.9  12.0 
 
* GDP price adjusted: chain-linked index (year 2000 = 100) 
** Average gross monthly earnings (in present euro) 
† Consumer price index for 4-person-households with medium income wage earners (1995 = 100) 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, http://www.destatis.de/  
 
On the face of things, the economic performance in the 60s continued 1950s trends (see 
Figure 3). Save for the numerically anomalous year if 1967, GDP growth averaged 5.2% 
and unemployment hovered around 0.8% with the overall population rising by 5 million. 
Real wages increased at a meaningful clip (9%). Upon closer inspection, however, the 
sixties proved more of a transition period from the “miracle” to the mediocre, rather than 
a strict extension of Wirtschaftswunder success. (Giersch et. al, 1994: 125) 
 
During the 1960s the economic situation shifted in its underlying philosophy, which 
affected policy decision-making. One indication of the Keynesian move towards 
“managed growth” was the establishment of the Sachverständigenrat (Council of 
Economic Advisors or SVR) in June 1963. (Heilemann, 2003: 90) This body, which 
comprised five experts, was to advise the German government on economic trends and 
appropriate responses. Its mandate encompassed four areas: price stability, employment, 
external balances (in both trade and financing) and a “constant and appropriate” rate of 
growth.
ix While the SVR retained little power to draft specific policy, it was entrusted 
with identifying harmful trends and crafting ways to avoid or mitigate them. Operational 
Keynesianism relied on the technocrat, an apolitical economic entity possessing the 
requisite knowledge and modeling methods to accurately target demand and employment 
deficiencies while implementing interventions. The SVR served this function. 
                                                 
83 It is worth noting that statistics measuring the active working population and/or persons engaged in 
economic activity actually fell over the decade. In 1960, 26.3 million participated in the labor force, whereas 
in 1970, only 26.1 million did. Unfortunately data does not exist for the early 1950s, but from 1957 to 1960, 
labor force participation increased by ca. 500,000 persons. (Statistisches Bundesamt, http://www.destatis.de) 
  39Attempting to put the Sachverständigenrat’s recommendations into practice revealed a 
large functional gap between the experts and the policymakers. This chasm was rectified 
in May 1967 with the passage of the Law for the Promotion of Economic Stability and 
Growth.
84 This provided the necessary legal framework for Karl Schiller’s demand 
management (Globalsteuerung). (Giersch et. al, 1994: 147) Article 109, Sections 3 and 4 
of the Basic Law were amended, endowing federal policymakers a wide discretionary 
anti-cyclical mandate.
x (Zuck, 1975: 63-5) From that point on, Keynesian policy in the 
Federal Republic of Germany became a question of “when” and “how” rather than “if.” 
 
4.4.2. Academia – By the end of the fifties, Schiller had distinguished two types of 
socialism – one based on the collectivization of the means of production, the other based 
on a central direction of the economic process. He steered his party, the SPD, in the 
direction of the latter. (Schiller, 1955: 14) The “free socialist way as mixing competition 
and planning” favored by Keynesians was certainly the prominent economic feature of 
the Godesberger Programm,
85 and Schiller twisted Eucken’s original argument for a 
“centralized directing mechanism” (i.e. stable, reflective prices) into justification for 
Keynesian planning. (ibid: 16-7) In academic terms, an ingenious ‘coup’ had thus been 
orchestrated, such that Socialism subsumed the successes of Ordoliberalism, claiming to 
add only Keynesian finishing touches.
86  
 
A book by Erich Preiser, published in 1967, provided evidence of the subtle intellectual 
transition – the passing of the baton – from Ordoliberalism to Keynesianism. Preiser was 
an avowed Keynesian, a strong voice against the totalitarian excesses of Nazism, but a 
supporter of planning after the war. The book, Political Economy Today: Foundational 
Problems of the Market Economy,
87 left little doubt that his academic orientation 
remained consistent. It opened with chapters on social problems of the free market and 
the perils of business cycles.
88 However, from the introduction, casual readers could be 
deceived into thinking that Preiser’s personal brand of economic philosophy had been 
instrumental in founding the Social Market Economy, that he was a founding muse in the 
Beirat, the logical successor of Eucken.
xi Preiser and Eucken were genial colleagues, 
united in loathing Nazism, but there was little link between their economic agendas. In 
fact, Preiser and other prominent planners had authored a minority report against the 
recommendations (to liberalize regulations and institute a currency reform) of the 1948 
Beirat Gutachtung. (Nicholls, 1994: 205) Yet by 1967, the Keynesian revolution in 
academia was so complete that distinguishing Preiser’s viewpoints from the founding 
Ordoliberal economic policies was no longer relevant.
89 Preiser was simply labeled a 
prominent voice (and expert) from the Soziale Marktwirtschaft time. 
                                                 
84 Gesetz zur Foerderung der Stabilitaet und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft (Heilemann, 2003: 111) 
85 Der freiheitlich-sozialistische Weg einer Verbindung von Wettbewerb und Planung. (Schiller, 1955a: 245) 
86 One doubts if Eucken would have been pleased at the expropriation of his logic to justify, for instance, 
production methods involving workers’ control councils (Schiller, 1955: 20-21), which were very similar to 
contemporaneous developments in Yugoslavia. (Nicholls, 1994: 368) 
87 Wirtschaftspolitik Heute: Grundprobleme der Marktwirtschaft (1967) 
88 Der soziale Problematik der Marktwirtschaft (p. 11) & Gefahrenpunkte der deutschen 
Wirtschaftskojunktur (p. 38)  
89 Hagemann (2004) wrote of an “Americanization of Economics” which replaced German Ordoliberalism 
with on one end of the philosophical spectrum Chicago-style neoliberalism and on the other, Keynesianism. 
  40 The creation of the Sachverständigenrat in 1963 signaled the government’s intent to 
involve itself in the macro policy process. As the SVR’s advisory mandate suggested, 
federal control was to include active participation in employment and labor markets as 
well as the optimal setting of growth targets. However, the legitimacy of the new 
Keynesian institution rested on the appearance of objectivity; technical, apolitical 
economic operations realized by experts. Former Beirat members and academics 
published articles in this vein. The “Freiburg Krise” founder Erwin von Beckerath 
together with Herbert Giersch authored an edition confronting “The Problem of 
Normative Economics in Political Economic Consultation.”
90 (Rieter & Schmolz, 1993: 
97) Another member of the ecumenical Nazi resistance movement, Oswald von Nell-
Breuning, wrote an article entitled “Objectivism and the Sachverständigenrat.”
91 For 
these “normative giants” – both of whom previously championed morally guided, anti-
Nazi social science – the sudden endorsement of objective methodology was an about-
face. It was, however, indicative of the 1960’s academic environment, as personalities 
associated with Ordoliberalism and the original Social Market Economy began to endorse 
Keynesian policy.   
 
Ordoliberalism receded from the academic scene, and by the mid-1960s it was at best an 
afterthought, a circumscribed historical aside in the primarily Keynesian agendas of 
policy-makers.
92 In fact, the “normative” economics of the 1940’s and 50’s had been for 
all intensive purposes replaced by quantitatively “objective” Keynesianism. 
 
4.4.3. Politics – In 1961, “Der Alte” Konrad Adenauer was pushing 85 years, the same 
age, his opponents muttered, of President Hindenburg in 1933.
93 Yet, the octogenarian 
forged onward into a fourth term. The CDU’s grip on power lessened noticeably, 
however, losing five percent to the Social Democrats along with its absolute majority in 
the 1961 election. (Nicholls, 1997: 164-5) In order to secure a coalition with the FDP, 
Adenauer promised to resign the chancellorship to Ludwig Erhard after a two-year 
period. (Bark & Gress, 1989: 472) The days of CDU invincibility seemed at an end. 
 
Karl Schiller again proved to be the most eloquent and persuasive SPD voice on 
economic matters, and he continued to press the Keynesian message. In a compilation of 
essays on economics and society published in 1964, he repeated his two-decade-long 
argument for enhanced macro coordination of the economy. (Schiller, 1964) With the 
SPD finally united behind his economic vision and the academic flank secured, Schiller 
was poised to make his Globalsteuerung program a reality. 
  
Ludwig Erhard, both as Minister of Economics and after 1963 as Chancellor, resisted 
enhanced fiscal discretionary mandates. However, Keynesian pressure mounted from all 
                                                 
90 Beckerath v. E. et al. (1963) “Probleme der normativen Ökonomik und der wirtschaftspolitischen Beratung” 
91 Nell-Breuning, v. O (1963) “Versachlichung und Sachverständigenrat”
92 Ordoliberalism’s ‘decline’ was also hastened by the deaths of two of its original and most forceful 
advocates: Rüstow in 1963 and Röpke in 1966. 
93 In March 1960, President Eisenhower commented that “there are clear signs of growing senility 
particularly in Adenauer’s tendency to focus on a single point, with loss of perspective on the whole range 
of considerations.” (FRUS, 1993: 240) 
  41sides. Schiller’s prognostications on the latent Wachstumsproblem (growth problem) have 
already been noted as have his numerous warnings on the state’s lack of preparation for 
managing business cycles. In November 1965, the Sachverständigenrat’s second annual 
report pointed with concern at unregulated tension between rising inflationary pressure 
and economic expansion. It recommended a new strategy to combat such problems (viz. 
the tradeoff between expansive growth and price stability), known as Concerted Action. 
(Giersch et. al, 1994: 143) This strategy amounted to a social compact between the major 
agents of Germany’s economy: fiscal and monetary authorities, the unions, and employer 
associations. These players were to meet periodically to coordinate wages and target 
growth goals. As a former State Secretary in the Ministry of Economics, Otto Schlecht, 
explained in 1969: 
 
Concerted Action is a short cut between the principal institutions of the economy in their autonomous wage 
and price decisions and the government, which must coordinate the aggregate economic elements. In the 
present situation economic goals in our free, non-authoritarian society can be preserved only if the 
economic power groups have more understanding for the economic interdependencies. These voluntary co-
ordination efforts will not work against the market; rather they are most likely to strengthen the market....In 
relation to wage policies, the strategy does not simply imply general appeals (moral suasion) or 
meaningless coffee parties, but neither does it restrict wage autonomy nor directly command social 
partners. Specific branch decisions on investment, prices, profits, wages etc., have to be left to steering by 
the market...The aim of Concerted Action is restricted to enlightening the partaking groups about the 
economic inter-relationships and to obtain understanding for the necessary decisions of the state – after 
mutual consultations – for its global steering, order and structural policies. (in Zweig, 1980: 41)  
 
Erhard’s government expressed distaste for Concerted Action measures. The differences 
between “coordination” and subversion of competitive market wage-bargaining seemed 
ill-defined. Erhard also had a sanguine history of weathering Keynesian protest, sticking 
successfully to Ordoliberal models. Recommendations and recriminations from 
personalities like Schiller often fell on deaf ears; until the first German economic 
downturn since the immediate postwar era occurred in 1966/67. 
 
The causes of the slight recession – negative 0.3% growth in 1967 – are less than clear. 
The Bundesbank tightened monetary policy severely in May 1966, in what was seen as a 
public demonstration that inflation (which averaged 3.44% in 1965)
94 would not be 
tolerated. Yet exports, West Germany’s particular strength, continued to rise throughout 
the recession. The sharp cyclic downturn of 1966/67 reflected a sharp drop in domestic 
demand. (Giersch et al, 1994: 145) Unemployment climbed to 2.1% (!) and nominal 
wages decreased for the first time in recent memory. More than anything, the 66/67 
recessionary blip resembled a classic ‘crisis of confidence’ or a ‘wanted recession’ rather 
than reflecting an endemic problem with the economic order.
95 (ibid) 
  
For Germans of the time, however, the recession was profoundly unsettling. To quote 
Dieter Haselbach:  
 
                                                 
94 Statistisches Bundesamt, http://www.destatis.de/, author’s calculation. Measures a consumer price index 
for 4-person-households with medium income wage earners. 
95 See Fels (1988) for a more complete discussion of the 1966/67 recession.  
  42 The [West German] founding myth was that of a people that had mastered its deepest crisis by mastering 
the economy, a people with a right to eternal economic success…The myth of economic success included a 
promise. Any darkening of the economic horizon in Germany…was immediately perceived as a crisis of 
identity. The first to experience this was the father of the economic miracle, Ludwig Erhard,…who was 
swept away by a temporary economic downturn. (Haselbach, 1998: 121) 
 
The downturn was indeed a fortuitous political event for the SPD. Schiller’s 
precautionary academic oeuvre and economic politicking were finally corroborated by 
real circumstances, and a jittery German public rewarded his soothsaying with their 
electoral attention. Popular support for Keynesian policy and institutions was such that in 
1966, Chancellor Erhard was forced to consider some sort of Konjuncturpolitik and the 
general coordination of economic policy. Even after his Social Market Economy aura was 
irreparably breached by recession, Erhard’s proposals remained half-hearted attempts to 
stave off an increasingly Keynesian-leaning electorate. 
   
For the first time, Erhard’s lack of enthusiasm for “economic coordination” – as well as 
his inability to enforce internal CDU party discipline – proved politically disastrous. 
(Nicholls, 1997: 187-8) As he sought to raise taxes to balance the fiscal shortfall caused 
by recession, the CDU’s coalition crumbled. In October 1966, ministers belonging to 
coalition partner FDP revolted against the hike, spurring the CDU’s Georg Kiesinger to 
negotiate a “Grand Coalition” with the SPD. Erhard resigned on the 29 of November. 
Karl Schiller was appointed Minister of Economics. 
 
“Concerted Action” was officially adopted on February 14, 1967. (Heilemann, 2003: 
108) In conjunction with a steady lowering of key interest rates by the Bundesbank, the 
Grand Coalition implemented an augmented version of Erhard’s original 
Konjunkturpolitik; the Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der 
Wirtschaft (StWG), which passed in May of 1967. The mandate focused on four familiar 
areas in an effort to direct business cycles: price stability, full employment, favorable 
current account balances and targeted growth rates. Together, these became known as the 
Magisches Viereck (Magic Quadrilateral).
xii All fell under the broad rubric of Schiller’s 
demand management (Globalsteuerung). Within a couple of months of Erhard’s removal, 
implementation of the Keynesian revolution was in full swing. 
 
Concerted Action and Globalsteuerung represented the death knell for Ordoliberalism in 
political life (despite assertions that the new policy simply complemented earlier 
conceptions of the Social Market Economy). Christian Watrin summarized the transition 
as “a break away from the market economy as an order based not on collective aims but 
on common spontaneous rules, and its substitution by the idea that some pre-set 
objectives ought to be pursued by all groups, totally in conflict with liberalism and the 
steering of the economy by anonymous price and market forces. The ‘enlightened market 
economy’ of Schiller in its program thus becomes socialistic.” (in Zweig, 1980: 41) The 
relatively quick official changeover of economic policy seems baffling in retrospect. 
Many in the CDU were still committed to Ordoliberal principles, as were the minority 
FDP, which held around 10% of the seats in the Bundestag. Yet the Grand Coalition 
provided a forum for a ‘meeting of minds’ between the governing parties. Had the SPD 
been governing alone or with a left of center partner, such a rapid transformation to 
  43Keynesian policies would not have occurred without significant opposition. (Nicholls, 
1997: 198) As it happened, the CDU was the partner party and could hardly oppose them. 
No doubt many policymakers also did not recognize, at the time, the historical 
significance of Schiller’s appointment or the StWG legislation. Whatever the case, the 
Grand Coalition was politically essential for the transition to Keynesianism. 
 
The 1967 economic downturn recovered after about a year. GDP growth averaged 5.5% 
in 1968 and the economy regained its previous strength. Real wages soared in the last 
years of the decade, transferring double digit percentage increases to workers. 
Government spending also increased handily, from an adjusted gross expenditure (in 
present Euros) of 75 billion in 1966 to 121 billion in 1972. To put these numbers in 
perspective, in the period from 1951 to 1965, government spending rose by 46.4 billion.
96 
In his tenure as Economics Minister, Schiller presided over the same amount of 
government spending in six years as Erhard had in fourteen.
97
 
By means of wage increases (vis-à-vis Concerted Action compromises) and invigorated 
fiscal spending, Keynesian stimuli functioned as promised and restored the economy to 
high growth rates. Schiller and the SPD were rewarded in the next round of elections 
(1969), gaining three percentage points and convincing the FDP to switch sides and 
support their coalition. The CDU/CSU, despite holding the largest bloc of Bundestag 
seats, was the minority under the SPD/FDP government of Willy Brandt. Schiller headed 
a new “Super Ministry,” a merger of the finance and economics portfolios. (Bark & 
Gress, 1989a: 154) The Keynesian era, as conceived by Schiller and others in the early 
years of the Republic carried the day. The policy-influencing tenets of Ordoliberalism, 





The previous periodization of economic events, academic trends and political happenings 
portrays the underlying shift of West Germany’s economic society from Ordoliberal to 
Keynesian philosophy.
99   
 
As we have seen, Ordoliberalism and Keynesianism maintained different conceptions of 
the optimal economic order and were often incompatible. The greatest divergence 
manifested in the realm of government intervention, where original Ordoliberal mandates 
limited the interference of centralized authorities. However, even in the heyday of 
Ordoliberal-influenced policymaking, theory was often compromised, for example with 
                                                 
96 All figures from Statistisches Bundesamt, http://www.destatis.de; author’s calculations 
97 Real inflation from 1966-1972 averaged 2.96% compared with a 2.14% average from 1951-1966. 
98 Incidentally, by 1981, formal budgetary expenditures by the central state apparatus (as a % of GDP) were 
higher in West Germany than in the Soviet Union, at 49.8 and 47.1 percent, respectively. (Kornai, 1992: 135) 
99 Precedent for this argument exists: see, Hagemann’s (1984) From Ordnungs to Konjunkturpolitik: the 
Functional Development of State Economic Policy in West Germany from 1948-1967, (title translated from 
German). This book, however, chronicles the “rise and fall” of the Social Market Economy and the policy 
transition, without delving into philosophic motivators. There is relatively little mention of Ordoliberalism 
and Keynesianism or their intellectual advocates. 
  44 monopoly power issues. In other cases the ideals endured, such as with an independent 
monetary policy focused on stable prices. Keynesianism, on the other hand, built 
momentum as time progressed. By 1967, remaining questions concerning business 
cycles, social programs and centralized economic guidance were no longer 
methodologically normative – viz. ought the state to intervene – but rather technical in 
nature, focusing instead on questions with a marked “where, when and how” character.  
 
Can an argument that relies on an intellectual understanding of reality prove persuasive? 
Ordoliberalism was forged as a scholarly reaction to Hitler’s regime and Weimar failures. 
It evinced a strong normative component, but an incomplete synthesis of detailed 
recommendations. Therefore, actual FRG developments of “Ordoliberal” economic 
policy perhaps owed as much to the political exigencies of continual crisis management 
as to the ruminations of Eucken and Röpke. In fact, it is inchoate to argue that 
Ordoliberal musings received a cohesive implementation, or even a privileged position 
within the political processes of Adenauer’s government. It is also something of a 
misnomer to equate intellectual endeavors with reality, the ontological Ordoliberal and 
Keynesian structures with political “sausage making.” 
 
Despite such imperfections and endless caveats, there exists a trend, intellectual perhaps, 
but descriptive of postwar German economic history nevertheless. After National 
Socialism, Ordoliberalism proved to be a powerful narrative, a motivating philosophy in 
early economic decision-making. In time, however, successes and changing 
circumstances dictated a process whereby the economic atmosphere, the philosophic aura 
surrounding the policy process, shifted focus, assuming a Keynesian worldview and its 
accompanying baggage.   
 
Thus, a subtle but dramatic change in economic philosophy occurred in the Federal 




5.1. How should one account for West Germany’s postwar economic 
success and its subsequent decline to a “Welfare State”? 
 
Accepting the historical argumentation of this paper assumes the prima facie 
understanding that economic success has been related to the postulates of 
Ordoliberalism.
100 A striking correlation exists between the philosophical bent of policy 
                                                 
100 Abelshauser’s (1975) arguments challenge the endogenous “Social Market Economy” policy 
explanation of postwar economic success. Even though they are of tangential importance to the 
Ordoliberal-Keynesian narrative, his assertions deserve some attention here. First, secular trend 
constructions, which argue growth rebounded to long-term trend after the war’s interruption, over-
aggregate and thus distort economic phenomena. While a popular methodology to contextualize history – 
see, for instance, Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century, (London: Verso, 1994) – it does a poor 
job of explaining individual economic behaviors. Second, Abelshauser states that foundations from the 
Nazi period (in terms of industrial capacity, human capital and infrastructure) underpinned growth in the 
postwar era. While partly justified, this argument ignores the composition of the factors of production, 
  45and the overall performance, in terms of high GDP growth and low unemployment 
figures, of West Germany’s economy. As long as Ordoliberal-inspired policy remained 
the ultimate arbiter of economic activity, success followed. After Keynesianism and the 
centralized dictation of business cycle policy took over in the latter 1960s, middling 
growth figures, consistently higher unemployment figures and general economic sclerosis 
began to dog German society. 
 
Definitively linking Ordoliberalism to Wirtschaftswunder or Keynesianism to subsequent 
stagnation, however, would require a still more protracted treatise, and even the most 
convincing analysis would be unlikely to convince those predisposed towards other 
economic beliefs. In as much, inspiring minds will undoubtedly find faults plaguing the 
use of this analysis – both in terms of internal argumentation and numerous exogenous 
factors left unconsidered
101 – as a basis for cogent commentary. That said, the 
Ordoliberal-Keynesian investigation still challenges the Federal Republic’s economic 
record to useful effect. 
 
5.2. The transition from Ordoliberalism to Keynesianism 
 
Although specific arguments concerning the relative merits of Ordoliberalism and 
Keynesianism are sufficiently left to the forensic eloquence of numerous aforementioned 
academics, the path of transition from one philosophic paradigm to the next deserves 
mention. As the nineteenth century poet Charles Baudelaire wrote: “My dear brothers, 
never forget, when you hear the progress of enlightenment vaunted, that the devil's best 
trick is to persuade you that he doesn’t exist!”
xiii Karl Schiller and other likeminded 
Keynesians framed their policy as a logical continuation of the Ordoliberal-inspired 
Social Market Economy. Their language was couched in the lingua franca of 
Ordoliberalism; it was often anti-monopoly, pro-market allocation and virulently anti-
communist. In Germany, however, Keynesianism was falsely conceived of as a non-
change, a technical fine-tuning of otherwise healthy economic processes, an infusion of a 
previously ill-defined social facet into the Soziale Marktwirtschaft. 
 
By hiding the normative implications of Keynesianism (centralized management of 
investment flows and employment prerogatives) and retreating behind a fortress of 
quantifiable and supposedly objective methodology, – viz. growth targets, natural rates of 
unemployment, etc. – policymakers afforded their efforts a degree of neutrality. 
                                                                                                                                                   
erroneously equating an autarkic, centrally-dictated Nazi war industry with the FRG’s export oriented, 
Mittelstand-driven capacity. Finally, he asserted that the 1950s and 60s were “boom” years internationally, 
and Germany did not stray too far from global trends. In fact, West German growth was an order of 
magnitude larger than even the most prosperous countries (see footnote 60). Using Abelshauser’s own 
statistics from the decade 1949-1959, Germany averaged 7.5% annual GNP growth versus 2.5% in Great 
Britain, 3.1% in Belgium and 4.5% in France, all of which also sustained heavy losses in the war and 
practiced instead more dirigiste reconstruction schemes. The FRG’s growth was twice that of the United 
States over the same period of time. In sum, it is difficult to deny deliberative Ordoliberal policy at least a 
marginal role in the economic successes. 
101 Prominent examples include: a) the 1970’s Oil/Stagflation Crises, b) the heavy burdens, for all involved, 
of Reunification c) rapidly globalizing economic trends, which are making high cost countries 
uncompetitive, and d) demographic aging and the possible negative consequences thereof. 
  46 Economists consequently became problem solvers in a technical, bureaucratic sort of 
sense, as they attempted to model reality with ever-improving quantitative methodology, 
working towards a vision of the omnipotent Keynesian technocrat, who, armed with 
optimal diagnostic and implementation tools, successfully prognosticated and 
preemptively managed all manner of economic evils.   
 
In as much, the theoretical and political workings of Keynesianism resemble a treasure 
hunt, as scholars excavate through layers of data in search of enhanced predictive 
capacities, more responsive models and the perfect intervention. Yet, for all of the 
burrowing and the fantastic trove of new knowledge thereby gained, economic trends 
remain fickle, with even the most sophisticated short and long-term forecasts rarely borne 
out in reality. Lost in the digging, policymakers have misread the economic “treasure 
map”. Even the soundest body of “objective” theory does not modify original Keynesian 
prescriptions, and those oft-ignored normative ramifications have transformed the 
German economic sphere to today’s suboptimal condition. 
 
5.3. What lessons are there for today? 
 
It would be much too simple to advocate for a return to the policies of Erhard’s era. 
Times have changed and current economic conditions both within and outside the Federal 
Republic are drastically different than they were in the 1950s and 60s. Yet, one can still 
learn from the Ordoliberal prescriptions behind Wirtschaftswunder success.  
 
German pundits (knowledgeable and otherwise), policymakers, scholars, and interested 
observers have in recent times often approached their numerous domestic economic woes 
as particular problems requiring rectification in a vernacular of individually customized 
solutions. Frequently referenced quagmires include convoluted and overly ‘rigid’ labor 
markets (including permanent unemployment), continually moribund conditions in the 
Eastern Länder, fiscal deficits, increasingly under-funded social programs, middling 
educational fortitude, consumer trepidation, fertility decline, decreasing global 
competitiveness, immigrant-focused xenophobia, and so on. However, perhaps partial 
responsibility for these myriad and ostensibly unconnected problems resides with the 
underpinning rationale for state interaction with society. Centralized apparatuses are 
currently charged with regulating economic and social prerogatives, manipulating 
aggregate demand and intervening with market forces using discretionary legislative 
imperatives and corporatist wage bargaining. In as much, markedly Keynesian incentive 
frameworks have been institutionalized in such a way that the present situation resulted. 
 
Current norms of structural unemployment and stagnant growth are symptomatic of a 
larger infirmity that has remained largely undiagnosed or overlooked.
102 Policymakers are 
                                                 
102 It is interesting to note that a nascent Neo-liberal movement does currently exist in Germany. Horst Seibert 
(2005), Herbert Giersch (amusingly, given his formative role in the SVR), and Hans Werner-Sinn (2005) are 
notable proponents of supply-side solutions. Werner-Sinn, for example, recently wrote: “The excessive 
Keynesianism, which only a fringe group of economic professors (Volkswirtschaftslehre) clings to, is in 
international practice dead.” (2005: 21, author’s translation) The proof, however, is in the pudding, and as of 
yet, economic policy lacks a cohesive response to the welfare state apparatus. Also, one is hard pressed to 
  47therefore unable to simply isolate one problem, say labor market rigidity, and deal with it 
separately from the entire philosophic bent of economic society. Revisions that do not 
take into account faulty Keynesian assumptions are doomed to fail. For example, as 
previously discussed, Keynes based his theory on the “stickiness” of the wage-price 
adjustment process, which eventually mandated centralized macro demand management 
to mitigate unemployment and business cycle oscillations. Under this rubric, government 
authorities have been primarily concerned with ameliorating and anticipating the fallout 
of economic fluctuations. The most basic of fallacies, post hoc, ergo propter hoc, 
affirming the consequent, is thus reinforced; to base policy on the “stickiness” of prices 
and wages is necessarily to accept this state of affairs, codifying the underlying problems. 
Instead, as Röpke so convincingly wrote in 1950, policymakers should concentrate on 
shaping underlying incentives to minimize the root causes of stickiness, or as 
Ordoliberals clarified, non-competitive processes.   
 
Ensuing implications address the necessity of reevaluating the entire German economic 
sphere as a failed Keynesian experiment. While much more research and policy definition 
needs to be done in the vein, the political conditions for a nascent resurgence of 
Ordoliberal policy may currently exist.
103 Recent developments, namely the formation of 
Germany’s second “Grand Coalition” between the SPD and CDU/CSU in 2005, broker 
intriguing possibilities. Recalling the first Grand Coalition’s decisive role in 
implementing Karl Schiller’s Keynesian economic ideas, it is conceivable that given 
effective leadership and a well-articulated vision (both of which are conspicuously 
lacking) the current party formation might marshal the political legitimacy necessary for 
a sweeping overhaul of the defunct Keynesian state. Wishful thinking or historical 
conceit, perhaps, but a provocative hypothetical nevertheless. Policymakers should think 
big, a new “Sprung ins kalte Wasser,” and redefine an economic and social platform that 
is motivated by market competitiveness, price stability and limited, non-discretionary 
government intervention. Recent history confirms this program not as an “Anglo-Saxon 
invasion,” but the fruition of a previously successful German academic movement. 
 
Current efforts at economic reform in Germany require a reconnection with Ordoliberal 
philosophy. For the last several decades, economists have focused on specific problems, 
attempting to fix them using the latest Keynesian-inspired modeling and policy tools. 
However, as Germany’s recent woes partly depict, the consequences of misjudging the 
normative character of economic society are indeed dismal. Economics is at its 
disciplinary roots the study of scarcity, and conclusions as to optimal resource 
distribution eventually require subjective, philosophically-motivated judgments. 
Keynesian prescriptions have failed in this capacity. Ordoliberal ideals are worth 
revisiting within Germany’s inevitable process of economic reform. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
find a credible, mainstream voice in Germany that categorically rejects Keynesian demand management as 
the original Ordoliberals did. Competitive order solutions, as such, have not been seriously entertained. 
103 This is helped by a resurgence of interest in the Wirtschaftswunder time from the popular press. In 2005, 
for instance, Der Spiegel ran a series detailing the 1950s, which included a relatively thorough inspection of 
the economic debate between Abelshauser and Erhardian/Ordoliberal ideas. See Alexander Jung, “Plotzlich 
waren die Regale voll” (Der Spiegel: n. 52, 2005) p. 48-53. 
  48 6. Translation Endnotes: Original German Text as Cited 
 
                                                 
i In diesem Sinn scheint mir viel von dem, was sich heute als sozial gibt, in dem tiefern und echtern Sinne 
des Wortes ausgesrochen antisozial zu sein. (Hayek, 1957: 84) 
ii Das System arbeitet sehr genau, aber es berücksichtigt nicht die Rückwirkungen, welche die 
einzelwirtschaftlichen Pläne und ihre Durchführung auf die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Daten ausüben – falls 
diese Rückwirkungen nicht im eigenen Planungsbereich der einzelnen Betriebsleitung spürbar werden. Man 
denke an die Zerstörung von Wäldern in Amerika, die den Boden und das Klima weiter Gebiete 
verschlechterte und zu einer Versteppung führte. Es geschah, weil in der Wirtschaftsrechnung des 
Waldbesitzers diese Wirkungen auf die Gesamtwirtschaft nicht oder kaum zum Ausdruck kamen. Oder 
man vergegenwärtige sich die gesundheitlichen Schäden, die durch chemische Fabriken und deren 
Abwässer in vielen Fällen hervorgerufen wurden. (Eucken, 1952: 302) 
iii Eine „Wettbewerbspolitik mit gestopfer Trompete“ ist kein Element einer auf Stabilität und Wachstum 
gerichteten Politik. Beide zu erreichen, das hängt entscheidend auch von der Intensität der 
Funktionsfähigkeit der wirtschaftlichen Konkurrenz ab. (Schiller, 1968: 58) 
  
iv Aber, was wichtiger ist, in positiver Hindsicht hat die zweite deuschte Demokratie sich in vielem besser 
gewappnet und – soweit sie bisher konnte – geschlagen.  Der Exzess einer offenen Inflation als Folge der 
Kriegsfinanzierung wurde dismal vermieden. (Schiller, 1953: 10) 
v Freiheit und Ordning sind beide für sich nicht absolut zu nehmen, nicht rein für sich in Totalität 
existenzfähig. Sie müssen gegeneinander und miteinander aufgehoben werden. Die höhig Verbindung 
zwische beiden kann man sehen in der christlichen Gerechtigkeit und Nächstenliebe. Man kann sie auch in 
der sozialistischen Brüderlichkeit erblicken. Das scheint uns so furchtbar verschieden zu sein. (ibid: 160) 
vi Demokratie ist eine unerlässliche Forderung vom Standpunkt jeder freiheitlichen politischen Bewegung 
aus; aber sie allein genügt nicht, um die Freiheit des sozialen Lebens zu verbürgen. 
vii „Die ‘industrielle Reservearmee’ muß endlich durch Maßnahmen der Vollbeschäftigungspolitik für 
immer demobilisiert werden. Dies ist die Magna Carta der Befreiung der Arbeitenden.“ (Held: 254) 
viii Figure 3 Text: 
  Ziel sozialdemokratischer Wirtschaftspolitik ist stetig wachsender Wohlstand und eine gerechte 
Beteiligung aller am Ertrag der Volkswirtschaft, ein Leben in Freiheit ohne unwürdige Abhängigkeit 
und ohne Ausbeutung. 
  Die Wirtschaftspolitik muß auf der Grundlage einer stabilen Währung die Vollbeschäftigung sichern, 
die volkswirtschaftliche Produktivität steigern und den allgemeinen Wohlstand erhöhen. 
  Um alle Menschen am steigenden Wohlstand zu beteiligen, muß die Wirtschaft den ständigen 
Strukturveränderungen planmäßig angepaßt werden, damit eine ausgeglichene Wirtschaftsentwicklung 
erreicht wird. 
  Eine solche Politik bedarf der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung und des Nationalbudgets. Das 
Nationalbudget wird vom Parlament beschlossen. Es ist verpflichtend für die Regierungspolitik, eine 
wichtige Grundlage für die autonome Notenbankpolitik und gibt Richtpunkte für die Wirtschaft, die 
das Recht zur freien Entscheidung behält. 
  Der moderne Staat beeinflußt die Wirtschaft stetig durch seine Entscheidungen über Steuern und 
Finanzen, über das Geld- und Kreditwesen, seine Zoll-, Handels-, Sozial- und Preispolitik, seine 
öffentlichen Aufträge sowie die Landwirtschafts- und Wohnbaupolitik. Mehr als ein Drittel des 
Sozialprodukts geht auf diese Weise durch die öffentliche Hand. Es ist also nicht die Frage, ob in der 
Wirtschaft Disposition und Planung zweckmäßig sind, sondern wer diese Disposition trifft und zu 
wessen Gunsten sie wirkt. Dieser Verantwortung für den Wirtschaftsablauf kann sich der Staat nicht 
entziehen. Er ist verantwortlich für eine vorausschauende Konjunkturpolitik und soll sich im 
wesentlichen auf Methoden der mittelbaren Beeinflussung der Wirtschaft beschränken. 
  49                                                                                                                                                   
  Freie Konsumwahl und freie Arbeitsplatzwahl sind entscheidende Grundlagen, freier Wettbewerb und 
freie Unternehmerinitiative sind wichtige Elemente sozialdemokratischer Wirtschaftspolitik. Die 
Autonomie der Arbeitnehmer- und Arbeitgeberverbände beim Abschluß von Tarifverträgen ist ein 
wesentlicher Bestandteil freiheitlicher Ordnung. Totalitäre Zwangswirtschaft zerstört die Freiheit. 
Deshalb bejaht die Sozialdemokratische Partei den freien Markt, wo immer wirklich Wettbewerb 
herrscht. Wo aber Märkte unter die Vorherrschaft von einzelnen oder von Gruppen geraten, bedarf es 
vielfältiger Maßnahmen, um die Freiheit in der Wirtschaft zu erhalten. Wettbewerb soweit wie möglich 
Planung soweit wie nötig! 
ix SVR Artikle 2: Der Sachverständigenrat soll in seinen Gutachten die jeweilige gesamtwirtschatliche 
Lage und deren absehbare Entwicklung darstellen. Dabei soll er untersuchen, wie im Rahmen der 
marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung gleichzeitig Stabilität des Preisniveaus, hoher Beschäftigungsstand und 
außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht bei stetigem und angemessenem Wachstum gewährleistet werden 
können. In die Untersuchung sollen auch die Bildung und die Verteilung von Einkommen und Vermögen 
einbezogen werden. Insbesondere soll der Sachverständigenrat die Ursachen von aktuellen und möglichen 
Spannungen zwischen der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage und dem gesamtwirtschaftlichen Angebot 
aufzeigen, welche die in Satz 2 genannten Ziele gefährden. Bei der Untersuchung sollen jeweils 
verschiedene Annahmen zugrunde gelegt und deren unterschiedliche Wirkungen dargestellt und beurteilt 
werden. Der Sachverständigenrat soll Fehlentwicklungen und Möglichkeiten zu deren Vermeidung oder 
deren Beseitigung aufzeigen, jedoch keine Empfehlungen für bestimmte wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische 
Maßnahmen aussprechen.  Source: http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/orga/gesetz.php 
x Pre-1967 text of G.G. Article 109: 
(1) Bund und Länder sind in ihrer Haushaltswirtschaft selbständig und voneinander unabhängig. 
(2) Bund und Länder haben bei ihrer Haushaltswirtschaft den Erfordernissen des gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Gleichgewichts Rechnung zu tragen. 
(3) Zur Abwehr von Gefahren für das gesamtwirtschaftliche Gleichgewicht können durch 
Rechtsverordnung der Bundesregierung Vorschriften über Ausmass und Art der öffentlichen Verschuldung 
erlassen werden 
(4) Das Nähere zur Durchführung der Absätze 2 und 3 regelt ein Bundesgesetz mit Zustimmung der 
Bundesrates. 
Post-1969 version of G.G. Article 109: 
(1) Bund und Länder sind in ihrer Haushaltswirtschaft selbständig und voneinander unabhängig.  
(2) Bund und Länder haben bei ihrer Haushaltswirtschaft den Erfordernissen des gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Gleichgewichts Rechnung zu tragen.  
(3) Durch Bundesgesetz, das der Zustimmung des Bundesrates bedarf, können für Bund und Länder 
gemeinsam geltende Grundsätze für das Haushaltsrecht, für eine konjunkturgerechte Haushaltswirtschaft 
und für eine mehrjährige Finanzplanung aufgestellt werden.  
(4) Zur Abwehr einer Störung des gesamtwirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts können durch Bundesgesetz, das 
der Zustimmung des Bundesrates bedarf, Vorschriften über 
1.  Höchstbeträge, Bedingungen und Zeitfolge der Aufnahme von Krediten durch 
Gebietskörperschaften und Zweckverbände und 
2.  eine Verpflichtung von Bund und Ländern, unverzinsliche Guthaben bei der Deutschen 
Bundesbank zu unterhalten (Konjunkturausgleichsrücklagen), 
erlassen werden. Ermächtigungen zum Erlaß von Rechtsverordnungen können nur der Bundesregierung 
erteilt werden. Die Rechtsverordnungen bedürfen der Zustimmung des Bundesrates. Sie sind aufzuheben, 
soweit der Bundestag es verlangt; das Nähere bestimmt das Bundesgesetz. 
xi Die Aufgaben, die der Wirtschaftspolitik in den Jahrzehnten nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg gestellt sein 
würden, haben Erich Preiser schon im Kriege beschäftigt; davon zeugen einige Aufsätze aus dieser Zeit, die 
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später unverändert nachgedruckt werden konnten. Mit Erwin v. Beckerath, Walter Eucken, Adolf Lampe 
und andere Kollegen hat er die Probleme der Nachkriegswirtschaft bis 1944 im Freiburger Kreis, seit 1948 
im „Wissenschaftlichen Beirat bei der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes“ 
diskutiert und in Gutachten behandelt. Der Mitarbeit in diesem Gremium, das seit 1950 als 
„Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundeswirtschaftsministerium“ tätig ist, hat er einen guten Teil seiner 
Arbeitskraft geopfert. (Preiser, 1967: 7) 
xii Preisniveaustabilität, Vollbeschäftigung, außenwirtschaftliches Gleichgewicht, stetiges und 
angemessenes Wirtschaftswachstum. 
xiii See Baudelaire’s poem “Le Joueur généreux”: “Mes chers frères, n’oubliez jamais, quand vous 
entendrez vanter le progrès des lumières, que la plus belle des ruses du diable est de vous persuader qu’il 
n’existe pas!” 
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